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A performed social movement captivated the Ukrainian nation in 2019. The 2019 
Ukrainian Presidential election marked a change in the form of campaign strategies of a 
presidential candidate. Ukrainian entertainer Volodymyr Zelensky made his political debut by 
running for President of Ukraine on a platform based on having no visible links to the political 
elites and essentially promised a new era in Ukrainian politics, absent of endemic corruption and 
an end to the War in Donbass. The style of Zelensky’s campaign tactics of merging 
entertainment into politics transformed Zelensky into a media phenomenon. Zelensky won the 
second round of the presidential election with a landslide victory. Earning 73% of the vote, 
Zelensky overcame traditional national voting cleavages winning with the largest majority in 
contemporary Ukrainian history. The aim of this thesis was to analyze how a politically 
inexperienced electoral candidate can construct a movement of electoral support which unites 
the people through social media campaigning. Through an interpretive single case study of the 
2019 Ukrainian presidential election, qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis drawn 
from 1753 social media posts from three social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, 
YouTube) was conducted. Through analysis of selected postings, coding was generated which 
ultimately mapped the two dominant themes in Zelensky’s social media discourse: spectacle and 
social movement. While academia may suggest that Zelensky’s performed social movement 
would be labelled as a face in the new era of populism, findings suggest that Zelensky’s 
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After nearly three decades with two revolutions, corruption and cronyism continues to be 
endemic in Ukraine. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine attempted to 
reform into a democracy with a free market economy through privatization. The outcome of the 
transformation was rampant clientelism and the formation of an oligarchic class. The general 
reaction amongst Ukrainian society was disgust towards the political elite and calls for 
dismantling the remnants of the communist system. The deep dissatisfaction held amongst 
Ukrainian society towards their state in part led to the Orange Revolution in 2004 and 
Revolution of Dignity between 2013 - 2014. An outcome of the Revolution of Dignity was Petro 
Poroshenko as the fifth President of Ukraine. Poroshenko was elected with the expectation of 
breaking the oligarchs’ hold over Ukraine. However, Poroshenko failed to fully meet this 
demand, leaving Ukrainian society prepared to restart power in the 2019 presidential election. 
On New Year’s Eve 2018, entertainer Volodymyr Zelensky ascended into the political 
arena announcing running for President of Ukraine in the 2019 presidential election. Zelensky 
fulfilled the presidential criteria demanded by much of Ukrainian society as he held no visible 
connections to the post-Soviet political elite. His lone association with politics was acting as 
President of Ukraine in the television series Servant of the People. With no credible political 
experience, team, or clear ideology, Zelensky marked the new year of 2019 by declaring his 
running for president in the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election. Ensued was an unprecedented 
political candidate and campaign. 
2019 marked a change in campaigning tactics. Multiple techniques of Volodymyr 
Zelensky’s presidential campaign were unpreceded. Traditional campaign methods were not 
conducted by Zelensky’s campaign. Zelensky’s political platform was paralleled to the plot and 
protagonist character from the television series Servant of the People. Social media was applied 
as the dominate platform of communication between Zelensky and voters. Zelensky completed 
his campaign tour in the format of a comedy tour with the Kvartal 95 troupe and debated in 
Kyiv’s Olympic stadium. As such, Zelensky’s campaign developed into a media phenomenon 
concentrated on social media. Through the uploading of daily posts and videos, Zelensky 
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interacted directly with voters through Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. The end result of 
Zelensky’s media campaign was winning with a landslide in the second round of the election 
with 73% of the vote. The political novice won with the largest majority in contemporary 
Ukrainian history. 
Across mass media and academia, Zelensky’s media phenomenon is overlooked. There 
continues to be widespread belief that Zelensky’s campaign won the 2019 Ukrainian Presidential 
Election as a result of disappointment from lack of reform following the Revolution of Dignity. 
The common assumption is that Zelensky was elected due to the level of dissatisfaction of the 
previous governments’ economic and political approaches (Nahaylo, 2019; Korosteleva, 2019; 
Minakov, 2019; Sasse, 2019), deep distrust of the political elite, and frustration from the ongoing 
War in Donbass (Rohozinska & Shpak, 2019). When Zelensky’s media campaign is mentioned 
by journalists or academics, it is generally described broadly such as ‘clever and novel’ 
(Nahaylo, 2019) and ‘dynamic’ (Kurmanova & Chebanenko, 2019). The factors mentioned by 
journalists and academics which led to Zelensky’s electoral win did contribute to Zelensky’s 
campaign success. Though, there remains a lack of knowledge on the concrete ways in which 
Zelensky mobilized the masses through social media platforms. Therefore, the purpose of this 
thesis is to expand upon the topic of Zelensky’s unmapped social media campaign strategy to 
answer how a politically inexperienced electoral candidate can construct a movement of 
electoral support which unites the people through social media campaigning?  In particular, to 
elaborate upon the ways in which Zelensky’s campaign mobilized votes through drawing in a 
variety of audiences by creating a spectacle.  
To answer the research question, two sets of concepts along with qualitative content 
analysis and discourse analysis will be applied throughout this thesis. The primary concept of 
social movement and the secondary concepts of performativity, spectacle, and populism are 
applied to provide a theoretical foundation to the research question. Qualitative content analysis 
will be applied on campaign posts on three social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, 
YouTube) to thematically assess how the posts produced situational meanings to viewers. Coding 
of social media postings will be conducted during qualitative content analysis to distinguish the 
main themes within Zelensky’s campaign program. Discourse analysis will be utilised through 
the close study of written language through posts and spoken language by Zelensky to uncover 
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linguistic messages to help explain how Zelensky became a media phenomenon in Ukrainian 
society during the presidential election.  
 
Conducting interviews was considered as a research method to answer the research 
question. Preliminary interviews with political professors and subject experts on Ukraine from 
Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University were conducted in Odessa, Ukraine in June 2019. 
The purpose of the interviews was to gain an understanding of the main voting factors in the 
2019 presidential election and to gain insight on how influential social media campaigning was 
to their vote. Further interviews with subject experts were planned in Kyiv, Ukraine in April 
2020 to provide more evidence to support answering the research question. However, due to the 
Covid-19 pandemic, all planned interviews scheduled in 2020 were cancelled.  
This paper makes three contributions to academia. First, this thesis will help fill the gap 
in existing literature on campaign styles in Ukraine, which has so far largely neglected to analyse 
the performance style of politics within Ukraine. Second, the analyses conducted in this thesis 
will provide deeper insight on the contemporary campaign tactics applied in populist 
communication style. Extending upon prior research on populism by investigating the campaign 
media strategy of Zelensky, this thesis will provide fuller understanding of the ways in which 
populism campaign tactics can be administered and performed through social media. On this 
basis, a new form of populism is developed to expose the process dynamics of Zelensky’s 
campaign strategy. Third, this thesis will demonstrate the increased applicability of Guy 
Debord’s spectacle in contemporary election campaign tactics. 
This thesis has five sections. Chapter introduces Ukraine’s political culture and history, 
leading to justification on the application of post-structuralism along with the concepts of social 
movement, performativity, spectacle, and populism. Chapter 2 outlines the data collection, design 
of research analysis, and the coding procedure. Chapter 3 analyzes Zelensky’s campaign tactics 
with focus on overarching themes. Chapter 4 analyzes how Zelensky’s campaign conducted 
populist communication to mobilize the masses, which is accompanied by introducing a new 
form of populism. The paper concludes by considering the broader implications of Zelensky’s 
campaign style and discusses the contributions of the thesis and possible directions for future 
research. 
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1. Brief Historical Approach 
 
 
1.1 Ukrainian Political Culture   
 
 
Ukraine’s declared independence from the Soviet Union was ensued by societal 
dominance of the oligarchs. On August 24, 1991 the Act of Declaration of Independence of 
Ukraine was passed.  Resulting, was Ukraine’s attempt to transition into a democratic state with 
a market economy. However, following the declaration’s passing, oligarchs emerged into 
Ukraine’s economic and political scene. The rise of the oligarchs was connected to the processes 
of privatization of state-owned assets as the Ukrainian economy transitioned into a market 
economy. Consequently, former Communists became highly influential in Ukrainian politics, yet 
no longer affiliated themselves with Communist parties. Thereupon Ukraine transitioned into a 
corrupt oligarchic state of which the oligarchs stood behind the header of defenders of 
democracy (Mudde, 2000, p. 48). The established oligarchic system resulted in a political system 
of patronage and clientelism. Subsequently, social inequalities and corruption levels dramatically 
grew while the average life expectancy and standards of living declining (Protsenko, 2018). As 
Ukraine consolidated into an oligarchic state, Ukrainian society consolidated their absence of 
trust towards their state.  
 
 Ukrainian society’s condemnation of their oligarchic state was demonstrated in two 
performative revolutions. Both revolutions called for the oligarchic state to fundamentally 
transform into an uncorrupt democratic state. In 2004, following the disputed electoral victory of 
Viktor Yanukovich, estimates of 500 000 to a million Ukrainians assembled in protest at Kyiv’s 
Maidan Square. The protests were a novel performance of protest. By day, protestors formed 
human barricades around government buildings, and by night, protestors attended rock concerts 
and rested in Maidan Square’s tent-city (International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2020; 
Lane, 2008). The protesters orchestrated an attempt to install a democratic pro-Western regime 
with European identification (Lane, 2008; White & Feklyunina, 2014). However, the revolution 
conquered support from only half of the country based in central Ukraine. Consequently, the 
threat of separatism emerged in Eastern Ukraine (Arel, 2005). No territories in Eastern Ukraine 
separated, but the ambition for independence continued into the following decade. In 2013, 
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Ukraine continued to be a divided society controlled by a composite of several oligarchic groups 
constantly fighting for power (Dubovyk, 2017, p. 47). Still, much of Ukrainian society yearned 
for transformation of Ukraine’s oligarchic state into a democracy. So, when former President 
Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign an EU Association Agreement supported by much of 
Ukrainian society for closer economic relations with Russia instead, democratic movements 
rejuvenated. The movement initially demanded for Yanukovych to sign the EU trade agreement 
and to end to the endemically corrupt system of government, but later turned into a revolution for 
democratic reform. The revolution staged in Kyiv’s Maidan Square became known as the the 
Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014). The staged protests in Kyiv’s tent-city emerged into ethno-
linguistic nationalism on the basis of language and region (Журавльов, 2015). As the protests 
drew in mass numbers, the violence escalated between protestors and police. The violent acts 
included torching of vehicles and hurling of stones and Molotov cocktails, which captured 
international media attention (Resende, Budrytė, & Buhari-Gulmez, 2019; Higgins & Kramer, 
2014). The violence was not concentrated in Kyiv, as it expanded into Eastern Ukraine with calls 
for separation. Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea (2014), conflict broke out in 
Ukraine’s eastern Donbass region between Kremlin backed pro-Russian separatists and 
Ukrainian government forces which became the War in Donbass (2014 – present). As such, both 
the Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014) contained 
performative elements as the protests escalated and increasingly divided Ukrainian society. 
 
 Petro Poroshenko was elected President of Ukraine in 2014 from his perceived capability 
to fulfill the protested demands during the Revolution of Dignity. Poroshenko was expected by 
Ukrainian society to dismantle the over two-decade legacy of state cronyism and corruption as 
well as able to end the War in Donbass. Under Poroshenko’s presidency, a number of reforms 
were passed to dismantle corruption, but they did not entirely break the oligarchs’ hold over the 
country. Much of Ukrainian society were left disappointed in the slow pace and depth of 
reforms, in addition to the added discontent over internal displacement and economic hardships 
caused by the War in Donbass (Rohozinska & Shpak, 2019, p. 34).  Ukrainian society perceived 
their country’s slow recovery from Russian aggression since 2014 being a result of various 
failures by reformers and statesmen under President Petro Poroshenko (Umland, 2019). 
Consequently, by 2018 there was a crisis on both horizontal and vertical levels. Ninety-one 
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perfect of Ukrainians claimed corruption was widespread in government and only nine percent of 
Ukrainians held confidence towards their national government (Bikus, 2019.) The level of 
distrust towards the Ukrainian state reached the highest level since 1991 (Kuczyński, 2019). 
Resulting was preparedness across Ukrainian society to restart power by means of complete 
removal of the political elites.  
 
The ideal candidate for the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election held no visible links to 
the political elites. Ukrainian entertainer Volodymyr Zelensky fulfilled this criterion. Zelensky 
emerged into the Ukrainian political scene tapping into the deep public desire for new political 
faces by means of entertainment. Zelensky’s election platform was promoted through 
performances on social media and on stage. Zelensky’s campaign essentially promised a new era 
in Ukrainian politics, absent of the endemic corrupt elite and an end to the War in Donbass. In 
the second round of the presidential election, Zelensky won by a landslide with 73% of the votes. 
Zelensky won with the largest majority in contemporary Ukrainian history by overcoming 
traditional national voting cleavages. Adding to the accomplishment, in a four-month period 
Zelensky’s election support rose from 9.4% to 73% (European Coordination Council, 2019, p. 
112). The politics of Ukraine had been reshuffled and the country witnessed a quiet revolution. 
 
1.2 Application of Post-Structuralism & Concepts 
 
Post-structuralism along with primary and secondary concepts will be applied throughout 
this thesis. Post-structuralism will be applied to consider to what degree Zelensky’s application 
of language held in the representation of himself during the campaign. The primary concept of 
social movement will be utilized in the investigation of how Zelensky’s campaign united the 
people. The secondary concepts of performativity, spectacle, and populism will be applied in the 
context of Zelensky’s campaign posts across social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, and 
YouTube). The posts include the form of images, videos, and texts which referenced Zelensky’s 
ambitions as President of Ukraine. The concepts of performativity and spectacle will be applied 
in the research of Zelensky’s performances with the Kvartal 95 performance troupe and in the 
lead-up to the stadium debate and the debate itself. The following section will provide further 
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elaboration on how post-structuralism and the concepts of performativity, spectacle, and 
populism will be applied in this thesis. 
The philosophic approach of post-structuralism challenges the assumptions on instability 
found within societies by deconstructing language. Particularly, post-structuralism argues that 
meaning is not fixed. Thus, the post-structuralist approach rejects structuralism’s view of 
language being, “a stable, unchangeable and totalizing structure” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 
10). Adding to the argument, post-structuralism claims that whatever is in our reality is the effect 
of the representation of language (Thomassen, 2017). As such, post-structuralism assumes that 
the versatility of language constructs social experiences and reality (Lazarević, 2015; Jørgensen 
& Phillips, 2002). Thereby, through critical inquiry, poststructuralism questions assumptions on 
language to reveal how language itself helps constitute the representation of our reality.  
Ukraine’s deepened societal divisions are contributed to language rhetoric produced 
following the Orange Revolution (2004) and Revolution of Dignity (2013). In both cases, 
language was produced which enhanced regional divisions. Following the Orange Revolution, 
regional polarization accelerated, and political divisions intensified (Buckholz, 2019; Wolczuk, 
2006). Retorted spoken and published language contained ‘pro-Russia’ and ‘pro-Europe’ labels. 
‘Pro-Russia’ referred to supporters of Russian political orientation who were Russian speakers, 
particularly from the in eastern and southern Ukraine in the regions of Donbass and Crimea 
(Kuzio, 2019, p.490). Whereas ‘pro-Europe’ insinuated supporters of a pro-European foreign 
policy of whom were generally situated in central and western Ukraine and Ukrainian speakers. 
The linguistic divisions through the labels of ‘pro-Europe’ and ‘pro-Russia’ continued into 2013 
during the Revolution of Dignity. Succeeding the second revolution were referendums on the 
status of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in addition to the breakout of hostilities and warfare in 
Eastern Ukraine. Consequently, language contributed to the construction of Ukraine’s societal 
divisions on a ‘pro-Europe’ versus ‘pro-Russia’ dichotomy.  
Unlike previous historical trajectory, language was a core component of uniting the 
masses in Zelensky’s campaign. Zelensky’s social media campaign was largely barren of clear 
statements on ideology and significant policy proposals (Rohozinska & Shpak, 2019, p. 33). In 
addition, Zelensky did not clearly articulate his political positions as his campaign lacked live 
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public exposure through the avoidance of interviews and public appearances. Thus, the common 
ideological labels applied in Ukrainian politics of ‘pro-Europe’ and ‘pro-Russia’ were absent 
from Zelensky’s campaign. Rather the hashtag #letsdoittogether (let’s do it together) was applied 
throughout the social media campaign. As language was a core component of Zelensky’s 
campaign in uniting the masses, post-structuralist approach is applied in this thesis for theoretical 
analysis on how the performative function of language can transfer into a campaign image. By 
applying post-structuralist critique, this thesis will construct alternative viewpoints on how social 
media posts and performed language contributes to the audience’s construction of an undefined 
campaign platform. Thus, through the application of post-structuralism, it will be highlighted in 
this thesis the persuasive development of language in the political sphere to explain how 
Zelensky was able to overcome traditional national voting cleavages. In addition, this thesis will 
expose how the lack of articulated ideology in Zelensky’s campaign language helped construct 
the representation of Zelensky’s persona.  
The primary concept of this thesis is social movement. Social movement is defined in this 
thesis as a horizontal practice which collectively links actors who are mobilized to create radical 
transformation of the state (Laclau, 2014, p. 9). As outlined by R. Kelly Garrett (2006), three 
structures are present within social movements: mobilizing mechanisms enabling individuals to 
organize and engage in collective action; social movement organizations and/or informal 
configurations, conditions in the environment that allow social movement activity (Garrett, 2006; 
Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014, p. 367). Since social movements generally focus on 
direct action, they often take the form of spectacular politics (Taggart, 2004, p. 278). Spectacular 
politics by means of social movements has been performed in Ukraine’s contemporary history 
during the Orange Revolution (2004) and Revolution of Dignity (2013 – 2014). Thereby, this 
thesis will explore whether there was a continuation of spectacular politics conducted by means 
of a social movement by Zelensky’s presidential campaign. As well, how social media was 
applied by Zelensky’s campaign to unite the people in the social movement.  
As social movements often feature populist mobilizations, populism is a secondary 
concept in this thesis. Since the early 2000s, populism in contemporary Europe has featured a 
number of events featuring populists mobilizing social movements. The social movements were 
not ‘exclusively populist’; however, the forms of mobilization contained strong populist features 
 18 
(Taggart, 2004, p. 270). As such, Paul Taggart (2004) has argued “only if we understand 
populism can we begin to fully comprehend… the nature of (some) European social movement 
mobilization” (p. 270). Therefore, this thesis will include the concept of populism to help explain 
how Zelensky mobilized the masses to vote for his election campaign. However, it should be 
considered that the definition of populism is exceptionally extensive, including being defined as 
a political ideology or as a style of political communication (Jakubowski, 2020). For nearly two 
decades, populism has predominately been conceptualized as an ideology. Much of this 
conceptualization can be attributed to Cas Mudde (2004) defining populism as an ideology, 
which later developed into the conceptualization of populism containing a “thin-centred” 
ideology. Many academics apply Mudde’s (2004) definition of populism as a thin-centred 
ideology (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Stanley, 2008; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Canovan, 2002). 
Though, a new wave of populism has developed in the past decade, promoting the idea of 
populism as a style of communication from the new conditions created by changes in the forms 
of media (Jakubowski, 2020). As such, this thesis refers to populism as a communicative style in 
effort to reveal how Zelensky’s campaign included populist communication through social media 
platforms to mobilize masses into a social movement. 
Judith Butler’s concept of performativity will be applied as a secondary concept for 
theoretical foundation. Zelensky’s campaign was composed of repeated performances of himself 
as an entertainer. Zelensky performed in a national comedy tour with his entertainment 
production company Kvartal-95 during the first round of the campaign. Through the repetition of 
performances conducted in eight cities across Ukraine, it seems as though through recurrent 
performances Zelensky reinforced his performance image as his persona rather than being a 
politician. Since 1997, Zelensky has be known for his comedic performances as he is the co-
creator of the Kvartal-95 cabaret with his entertainment production company Kvartal-95 being 
aired on television channel ‘1+1’ since 2003. Therefore, Zelensky’s popular image as an 
entertainer was preestablished prior to the campaign. As such, by conducting numerous comedy 
concerts, there was reiteration of Zelensky being outside of the political elite. 
Zelensky’s campaign contained a prevalent pattern of repeated character performances. 
Zelensky’s character as protagonist Vasyl Petrovych Holoborodko from the television series 
Servant of the People made repetitive appearances through visuals across Zelensky’s social 
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media campaign. Particularly reinforced in social media posts was Zelensky’s persona paralleled 
to character Holoborodko regarding his ordinariness and pursuit to overcome institutional 
dilemmas. In addition, the third series of Servant of the People was released days before the first 
round of voting in the election. Through audiovisuals, the third series was linked to the campaign 
as the plot consisted of Holoborodko re-campaigning to be President of Ukraine amongst 
political rivals who looked similar to Zelensky’s campaign rivals. The third series concluded 
with Holoborodko’s pursuit to transform Ukraine into the promised land of economic miracles. 
As such, Zelensky’s campaign conducted reinforced repetition of his performance image in the 
television series Servant of the People. 
The lead-up to the stadium debate was a month-long performance. Zelensky’s campaign 
organized a debate against opponent Petro Poroshenko held in performance format at Kyiv’s 
Olympic stadium. The lead-up to the stadium debate contained a social media spectacle 
performed by Zelensky’s campaign. As for the debate itself, Zelensky referenced to his character 
performances rather than his political platform. On stage, Zelensky repeated the discourse of 
himself being an ordinary man who planned to end the corrupt system of government as 
President of Ukraine. Zelensky reinforced the image already established by his character 
Holoborodko on Servant of the People. Furthermore, through performed language, Zelensky 
reinforced his ambition to bring a particular prosperous future for the Ukrainian nation. 
Performativity will be applied as a theoretical foundation to analyze the ontological 
effects of Zelensky’s performances on the perception of Ukraine’s societal reality. According to 
performativity, a repetition of acts achieves effects over a duration of time. The effect of 
enforced repetition is the construction of reality. Social and cultural forces contribute to the 
construct of reality from their production of sustained illusions (Hey, 2006, p. 443). As such, due 
to Zelensky’s repeated performances through social forces, by means of social media and the 
stadium debate, and cultural forces, through the means of television and comedy performances, 
performativity will be applied to analyse the effect of Zelensky’s performance images on 
campaign audiences. Particularly analyzed will be Zelensky’s performative language, since 
performativity argues that language has a performative function, due to its power to shape 
reality. Thereby, due to the concept of performativity’s focus on the reiteration of performances 
and its effects on naturalized assumptions of what constitutes reality, performativity will be 
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applied in this thesis. Performativity will be applied in the analysis of the effect to which 
Zelensky’s performance images had on the formation of his image in reality during the 
presidential campaign. 
 
This thesis will incorporate Guy Debord’s concept of the spectacle as a secondary 
concept. The spectacle will be included to understand how Zelensky’s campaign postings on 
social media shaped Zelensky’s campaign image. Debord’s Marxist manifesto of Society of the 
Spectacle offers a means to examine the virtual personality created by Zelensky’s performances 
and its extrapolation by audiences. Included in the manifesto are two concepts: spectacle and 
spectators. The spectacle is a representation of life through imagery which can be applied for 
different means such as a tool for pacification, an instrument to distract people from their tasks, 
and a means to occupy an individuals’ social life (Best & Kellner, 2001; Best & Kellner, 1999). 
Ultimately, the complete spectacle is the case in which commodities attain total occupation of 
social life, blurring illusions with reality with visual imagery becoming ‘reality’ (Bunyard, 2011, 
p.17). As for spectators, it is the case of individuals partaking in the illusion of reality by 
becoming compliant consumers of commodities and mass media, viewing the world they are 
conditioned to see through the commodity. Fitting to Debord’s manifesto (1977), Zelensky’s 
campaign appeared to be saturated with daily imagery that became reduced to a spectacle of 
posts and videos uploaded onto social media with spectators partaking in the media-spectacle. 
 
Zelensky campaign applied both the plot and protagonist character from television series 
Servant of the People’s into his social media-spectacle. The popular television show Servant of 
the People encompassed the hopes and dreams held by much of Ukrainian society - a prosperous 
nation absent of systemic corruption. Zelensky’s played character Holoborodko was a high 
school teacher elected President of Ukraine, and as president destroyed Ukraine’s endemic 
corruption to transform Ukraine into a prosperous European country. The television series 
essentially broadcasted what Ukrainian society had been yearning for since post-independence. 
Thus, assessed will be the visual application of a spectacle through social media by means of 
references to the plot and character Vasyl Petrovych Holoborodko from the television series 
Servant of the People as to whether the series character was a building block to Zelensky’s 
campaign image.   
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The means of application of Zelensky’s social media campaign seems to increase the 
relevance of the concept of the spectacle. Zelensky’s presidential campaign dominated across 
social media applications (Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube), closing the distances and 
experiences between voters. Due to the increasing use of screens by society, it produces an 
increase in image use and circulation (Dewdney & Ride, 2014). The spectacle has taken new 
stages since Debord’s time of writing of the manifesto, including mobile phone and computers, 
increasing its presence from the television (Best & Kellner, 1999). Thereby, as Zelensky’s 
campaign program promoted the television series’ plot across media platforms, this thesis will 























2. Design of Social Media Analysis 
 
 
In terms of research design, this thesis conducts an interpretive single case study. The 
case study will interpret the performative elements of Zelensky’s campaign communication and 
how the performative elements transformed Ukrainian society into a united social movement. 
Case research is conducted in order to derive a more contextualized interpretation of Volodymyr 
Zelensky’s media phenomenon during the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election campaign. This 
phenomenon of interest will be studied by applying qualitative content analysis in order to 
provide a systematic description of the meaning of the data collected from postings on social 
media. Discourse analysis is also applied on the campaign language, both written and spoken, to 
understand the meaning of the produced campaign language. The sections below will go into 
detail on the selected data and the application of the analyses. 
 
2.1 Data Overview  
 
 
Three social media platforms were investigated for postings uploaded by Zelensky’s 
campaign. The social media accounts of Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube were investigated 
and became the sources of data collection for this thesis. The data was collected from the official 
social media campaign accounts of Zelensky’s campaign: Зе! Президент (YouTube); Команда 
Зеленського (Facebook); ZeTeam 2019 (Instagram). The unit of analysis and main data source 
were posts on the official social media accounts of Zelensky’s campaign. The unit of analysis for 
YouTube were posted videos. As for Facebook and Instagram, the unit of analysis were posts 
that included either images, videos, or text. Figure 1. presented below illustrates the number of 
social media posts under analysis according to each online platform. The posts were gathered 
from the respective social media websites in the time period of the January 1, 2019 - April 21, 
2019. Under analysis were 50 YouTube videos, 835 Facebook posts, and 598 Instagram posts. 
Thereby, a combined total of 1483 social media posts were under analysis to support answering 
the research question. 
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Figure 1. Number of Posts. This figure demonstrates the number of posted posts by       
Zelensky’s Campaign on YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram between January 1, 2019 
 – April 21, 2019.  
Source: Authors own compilation. 
 
 
Facebook and Instagram were chosen sources for the data sample. Due to the relatively 
large number of postings during both rounds of the presidential campaign, both social media 
platforms were chosen for their quantity of posts. In the first stage of empirical research, 
observed social media posts from the first round of the election campaign (January 1, 2019 - 
March 31, 2019) were concentrated on Zelensky’s official campaign Facebook page (546 posts) 
and official campaign Instagram page (413 posts). In the second stage of empirical research, 
observed social media posts from the second round of the election (April 1 - April 21, 2018) 
were again concentrated on Zelensky’s official campaign Facebook page (289 posts) and official 
campaign Instagram page (185 posts). Refer to Figure 2. for the illustration of the number of 
monthly posts analyzed for each social media platform under analysis. 
 
 YouTube was a selected data source due the video content and high number of audience 
views. In the first stage of empirical research, Zelensky’s campaign posted 36 videos on its 
YouTube channel and in the second election round posted 14 videos. Compared to Facebook and 
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videos posted (see Figure 1.). However, in the primary stage of analysis, focal themes were 
identified regarding the production of popular narratives. The production of popular narratives 
continued to be identified in the secondary stage of analysis. In addition, YouTube videos views 
reached a much larger audience number ranging between 116 000 views to 3 200 000 views. In 
comparison to Facebook and Instagram, 100 000 views were the average number of videos 




Figure 2. Monthly Posts. This figure demonstrates the number of posts uploaded on   
social media per month in 2019. 
Source: Authors own compilation. 
 
Figure 2. illustrates the number of monthly posts analyzed in the time period under 
analysis (January 1 - April 21, 2019). A large section of the data analyzed in this thesis was 
generated in the last two months of the campaign – March and April 2019. There was a 
significant rise in posts in March and April due to the first voting round being conducted on 
March 31, 2019 and the second voting round being conducted on April 21, 2019. Also illustrated 
is that Instagram and Facebook were much more applied in content number compared to 
YouTube. 
Telegram and Twitter are not applied data sources in this thesis. Although, both social 
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mediums applied by Zelensky’s social media campaign. However, upon completion of the first 
stage of empirical research, it was discovered that the majority of data on Telegram was located 
in private chat forums within the platform and was inaccessible to the researcher. As for Twitter, 
it was not an active source of posts in the campaign in comparison to Facebook and Instagram. 
As well, Twitter had significantly less campaign followers (circa 31 000) in comparison to 
YouTube (circa 699 000), Facebook (circa 713 000), and Instagram (circa 1 200 000). Therefore, 
Telegram and Twitter were eliminated as data sources in the second stage of empirical research. 
 
Preliminary interviews with professors and subject experts were conducted as a data 
source. Nine interviews were conducted in semi-structured format June 2019 with academic 
experts from Odessa I. Mechnikov National University in Odessa, Ukraine. The purpose of the 
interviews was to provide the author a better understanding of Ukraine’s contemporary history 
and topics of national interest and concern during the 2019 presidential election. Thereby, the 
interview questions were generalized covering multiple topics: political developments in Ukraine 
following Euromaidan; the election of Volodymyr Zelensky; contemporary domestics issues; 
Ukrainian foreign policy. The author applied the interviews as a means of a guiding tool for 
developing the research design to answer the research question. Additional interviews were 
planned in Kyiv with professors and subject experts in April 2020 to provide additional 
substance to answer the research question. However, due to the Covid-19 pandemic all 
interviews in 2020 were cancelled.  
 
2.2. Conducted Analyses 
 
Qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis will be conducted in this thesis. 
Qualitative content analysis will be applied to systematically describe the meaning of qualitative 
data in the form of social media posts. This will be completed by assigning data categories 
within a coding frame through thematic analysis. Discourse analysis will be applied to add a 
more critical understanding of the meaning of language in the database. The following section 
will provide further detail on the procedure of analyzing data and the particular issues being 
analyzed.  
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Qualitative content analysis will be completed on audio and visual data. The content 
under analysis will be campaign images and videos on social media (Facebook, Instagram, 
YouTube) that were produced and posted by Zelensky’s campaign. The focus of the analysis will 
be on visual elements, including colour, composition, size, and scale, to uncover the impact of 
the meaning conveyed by audio and visual posts. In addition, the analysis will be completed on 
audio and visual posts to better understand how the posts communicated ideas, content, and 
meanings to audiences. Thus, images and videos posted on social media will be analyzed in the 
thesis to gain knowledge on how these posts contributed to mobilizing the masses in support of 
Zelensky’s campaign. 
 
Qualitative content analysis on audio and visual data will be conducted in two phases. 
The first phase will be observation of visual images. Images will be closely observed for 
identifying reoccurring visual attributes and elements. Selected images from the campaign will 
be compared to reveal whether there were common patterns or portrayals. The second phase will 
be thematic analysis to identify the main themes found within the database. Thematic analysis 
will be applied in effort to describe and map recurrent themes found within social media postings 
in order to develop an understanding on the visual logic behind the data. Particularly analyzed 
will be the messages the images and videos conveyed in reference to the presidential campaign. 
There will be consideration of the observations found, leading to thesis statements made on the 
audio and visual data based on the evidence. Thus, through qualitative content analysis, this 
thesis will methodically and objectively assess variable features found within images and videos 
of Zelensky’s campaign media posts and how it contributed to mobilizing the masses for 
electoral support. 
 
Discourse analysis will be conducted to investigate Zelensky’s campaign performances in 
regard to the language of text and dialogue. The objective of discourse analysis is to explain 
aspects of society through the close study of language and language use (Taylor, 2013, p.4). 
Discourse analysis assumes the principle that language provides evidence on a social 
phenomenon (Taylor, 2013, p. 3). In the context of this thesis, discourse analysis will be applied 
as a means to help explain how the application of language in Zelensky’s campaign mobilized 
support across Ukrainian society. Discourse analysis will firstly be applied for the close reading 
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of text in postings (Facebook and Instagram) and text within images on social media (Facebook 
and Instagram) to formulate an argument about the messages conveyed within the text. 
Discourse analysis will be applied in this context as this form of analysis particularly helps to 
understand the meaning of text in social media due to the analysis stemming from the belief that 
text is neither neutral nor free (Azmi, Sylvia, & Mardhiah, 2018, p. 174-175). This thesis will not 
only analyze written text but also spoken language in videos (YouTube, Facebook and 
Instagram). Thus, written and spoken language will be disassembled to uncover campaign 
messages. As such, discourse analysis will be conducted to disassemble messages produced 
through campaign language in effort to reveal how it conveyed a particular impression on 





A qualitative coding scheme was conducted during qualitative content analysis. Coding 
was conducted in order to identify and determine prevalent themes expressed in Zelensky’s 
campaign. The coding of data during qualitative content analysis was conducted in three stages. 
In the first stage of analysis, social media posts uploaded during the first round of the campaign 
(January 1, 2019 – March 31, 2019) were observed: Facebook 546 posts; Instagram 413 posts; 
YouTube 36 posts. In the second stage of analysis, social media posts were observed which were 
uploaded during the second round of the campaign (April 1, 2019 – April 21, 2019): Facebook 
289 posts; Instagram 185 posts; YouTube 14 posts. Refer to Figure 2. to view the number of 
posts analyzed monthly. Through the close reading of selected posts, this analysis generated 
various codes that mapped dominating themes within Zelensky’s media campaign. In the third 
stage of analysis, two over-arching focal themes were identified: spectacle and social movement.  
 
There were multiple categories of grouping of the elementary codes. The initial 
categories of code grouping in the first stage of analysis were anti-nationalist, political outsider, 
inclusive, progressive. Anti-nationalist categorized data content which was critical of 
Ukrainianization and contradicted opponent Petro Poroshenko’s campaign. Political outsider 
categorized data content that referred to ending Ukraine’s oligarchic system, and atypical 
political attire worn, and language promoted by Zelensky. As for inclusive, it was the code given 
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to data which was inclusive to both ‘pro-Europeans’ and ‘Russophones’ and data that included 
‘They vs We’ statements. Progressive code was provided to data which referred to Zelensky’s 
willingness to end the War in Donbass and remove corruption, as well as promoted mobilizing 
voter’s opinions and concerns over social media. In the second stage of analysis, the codes were 
re-organized into more meaningful categories: engagement; transparent; reformist. The code 
participation was labelled on content which mobilized voter engagement within the campaign 
and promoted voting. Transparent was the code for data which featured Zelensky’s campaign, 
campaign team, and personal activities. Reformist was the code for data which educated 
audiences on voting and preventing election fraud, featured Zelensky speaking directly to 
audiences via social media videos, promoted party membership for all demographics, and 
referred to Zelensky as being a political outsider. Performance was the applied code to data 
containing performances with Kvartal 95 and the stadium debate. Following completion of two 
stages of analysis, two main codes were produced in the third stage of analysis: social movement; 
performance. Table 1. outlines the categories of code groupings in each stage of analysis. 
 
Table 1. 













Third Stage • Spectacle 
• Social Movement 
      Table 1. Stages of Categorical Grouping of Codes 





Figure 3. Monthly Spectacle and Social Movement Posts. This figure demonstrates the 
number of monthly posts in 2019 categorized as either spectacle or social movement 
uploaded on social media. 




Figure 4. Post Themes on Social Media. This figure demonstrates the total number of    
social media posts uploaded by each social media platform during January 1, 2019 – 
April 21, 2019 that qualify for the coding categorization of spectacle or social movement. 








































The first main code produced in the third stage of analysis was spectacle. The spectacle 
in this thesis is defined as an artistic representation of life which is visually produced through 
imagery (Bunyard, 2011; Hartle, 2017). The spectacle can be formed through different 
productions including by the mass media and staged events (Hartle, 2017; Best & Kellner, 1999). 
As Zelensky’s campaign was found upon qualitative content analysis to be primarily based on 
social media and secondly centered in live performances, the spectacle was found to be 
pervasive within the database. Particularly, the spectacle was identified during the analysis 
across social media platforms, as social media has become a naturalized space of work, politics, 
and entertainment (Elias, 2010, p. 822). Thereby, the increasing use of social media relates to the 
increase in spectacles through image use and circulation (Dewdney & Ride, 2014). As such, 
images in the database which were mass circulated in Zelensky’s campaign were coded as 
spectacle: selfies videos and photos; Mr. Zelensky & Mrs. Zelensky voting. Likewise, data 
which promoted Zelensky’s campaign through imagery were coded as spectacle: campaign 
slogans and merchandise; campaign cartoons. In addition, orchestrated special events that 
dramatized the election campaign were coded as spectacle: vlog series ‘Ze! President is the 
Servant of the People;’ posts related to the stadium debate; campaign commercials. Also coded 
as spectacle was data which referred to marketing particular personalities more than political 
platforms: references to the television series Servant of the People; Kvartal 95 performances; 
interviews. Table 2. illustrates the database examples coded as spectacle. In sum, the thematic 


















• Selfies videos and photos 
• Mr. Zelensky & Mrs. Zelensky voting 
• Campaign cartoons 
• Campaign slogans and merchandise 
• Vlog series ‘Ze! President is the Servant of the People’ 
• Content related to the stadium debate 
• Campaign commercials 
• References to television series Servant of the People 
• Kvartal 95 performances 
• Interviews 
 Table 2. Database Examples Coded as Spectacle 
 Source: Authors own compilation. 
 
 
The second coded produced was social movement following qualitative content analysis 
of social media posts. In contemporary political events, social media has increasingly become a 
factor in promoting social movements, particularly in the organization and communication of the 
movement (Soares & Joia, 2015, p.1). The advantage of the application of social media in social 
movements is that it enables movements to spread rapidly and widely while bridging 
communication between actors and citizens (Soares & Joia, 2015, p.3). Consequently, social 
media has become a key driver escalating the process of expansion of social movements (Soares 
& Joia, 2015, p. 9). Following coding of data derived from social media, the theme social 
movement was identified. In this thesis, social movement is defined as an organized cause with a 
common goal of social change. The core of this theme in the campaign was the narration of 
Zelensky bringing in a new era of politics to Ukraine together with voters. Thus, social media 
posts which referred to changing the political system of Ukraine through voting was coded under 
the theme social movement: vlog series “don’t f... up the elections”; voting information. Adding 
to this coding theme was the narration of Zelensky’s team countering election fraud to further 
change the system, leaving posts referring to ‘Ze Team’s election monitoring’ as a social 
movement. Other posts which referred to Zelensky’s team activities and members, particularly in 
their efforts to provide transparency to change the political system was coded as a social 
movement. In addition, social media allows for an increase in the intensity of social connection in 
the creation of agenda setting within social movements (Soares & Joia, 2015, p. 6). Therefore, 
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social media posts which encouraged audience participation and input into the campaign was 
coded as social movement: social media campaign challenges; mobilizing audience input. As 
social media is a factor which escalates the evolution of social movements, social media posts 
referring to the expansion of ‘Ze Team members and supporters’ and increase in support of 
Zelensky’s campaign by means of ‘election polls’ and ‘election results’ were coded as a social 
movement. Table 3. illustrates the database examples coded as social movement. Furthermore, 
social media posts which referred to the organization and communication of social change in 
Ukraine were coded as social movement. 
 
Table 2. 





• Vlog series “don’t f... up the elections”   
• Voting information 
• Election monitoring 
• Transparency of ‘Ze Team’ members and activities  
• Internet campaign challenges 
• Mobilizing audience input 
• Expansion of ‘Ze Team’ members and supporters 
• Election results  
• Election polls 
 Table 3. Database Examples Coded as Social Movement 















3. Analysis of the Social Media Campaign 
 
 
3.1 Analysis of Posted Images 
 
 
Through the application of qualitative content analysis, this section will analyze the 
images produced by Zelensky’s campaign on social media. Particularly analyzed will be photos 
uploaded onto Zelensky’s social media campaign accounts of Facebook, ‘Команда 
Зеленьского,’ and Instagram, ‘Ze Team 2019.’ Specifically, photos from Facebook (circa 540) 
and photos from Instagram (circa 350) will be visually analyzed, for a total of circa 890 images 
under analysis. The analysis will particularly focus on the composition of the images to 
ultimately evaluate how the images produced campaign messages to audiences. 
 
3.1.1 Blurring Zelensky with Holoborodko 
 
In the initial launching of Zelensky’s social media campaign, Zelensky’s presidential 
program was paralleled to character Holoborodko. There were repeated uploads of a still shot 
image of character Holoborodko acting as President of Ukraine across Instagram and Facebook. 
In the photo, Zelensky is featured as character Holoborodko walking dressed in a in a suit and tie 
while holding a briefcase. Upon analysis, the composition of the photo was found to be 
strategically put together. Zelensky is the largest image in the photo in addition to being in the 
focal point of view, with the background blurred and out of focus. Thus, when viewing the 
photo, the audience’s attention is immediately directed to Zelensky as Holoborodko. In regard to 
value in terms of lighting, character Holoborodko is the most lit shape in the photo. Thus, the 
composition of the photo emphasized character Holoborodko as being an important personality 
in the context of the campaign. 
 
A photo of Zelensky acting as Holoborodko was strategically circulated in the first month 
of the campaign. Through empirical research, it was found in the month of January the image 
was posted six times on Facebook and Instagram respectively. The still shot image became the 
cover photo of the official campaign Facebook page on January 1, 2019 following Zelensky’s 
announcement of running for presidency on December 31, 2018. The image was the cover photo 
of the campaign Facebook page for nearly four weeks (December 31, 2018 – January 25, 2019). 
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On January 25, 2019, Zelensky’s campaign released the presidential program on   Facebook and 
Instagram featuring the same screen shot of Holoborodko acting as President of Ukraine at the 
top of the program. The empirical evidence shows how Zelensky’s presidential campaign 
strategically circulated Zelensky’s performance image from the television series Servant of the 
People in reference to the campaign program. 
  
Zelensky’s campaign directed spectators to connect Zelensky’s campaign with his 
television character Holoborodko performing as the President of Ukraine. Upon analysis of data 
in terms of visual elements, the circulated photo of character Holoborodko was discovered to be 
paralleled to Zelensky’s political persona. Thus, the television series Servant of the People was 
the initial principal in Zelensky’s media-spectacle. Zelensky’s campaign strategy corresponded 
to Debord’s argument of the spectacle being mediated by images of which creates a social 
relationship between the spectator and the images (Debord, 1995). Therefore, the plot of the 
series of character Holoborodko’s pursuit to bring stability to Ukraine by ousting the 
endemically corrupt government was visually connected to Zelensky’s campaign. As such, 
Zelensky’s campaign performed Debord’s argument, “the world we see is not the real world but 
the world we are conditioned to see” (Debord, 2012). Thereby, Zelensky’s campaign purposely 
framed to the audience through imagery of Zelensky being a presidential candidate in pursuit of 
progress and stability for Ukraine. 
 
3.1.2 The Digital and Progressive Team  
 
The increase in campaign membership was visualized through posts. In January 2019, 
Zelensky’s campaign began recruiting ‘Ze Team’ members. A series of recurrent posts 
visualized the increase in number of registered party members and offices. The composition of 
the photos included the map of Ukraine as the focal point. The map was shaded green according 
to where ‘Ze Team’ offices were located. Thus, as the number of party members and offices 
increased, the map of Ukraine became greener. A pattern was found of the over twenty posts 
featuring the Ukrainian map becoming greener. The increased green shading of the map 
promoted the notion that Ukraine was growing united as ‘Ze Team’ expanded. The spectacle of 
the ‘greening’ of Ukraine presented Zelensky’s campaign as something enormously positive, 
which according to Debord leads it to becoming valued and assumed important (Debord, 1992). 
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In addition, the posts were greatly visible in regard to the bold, blue lettering, of the number of 
‘Ze Team’ members broadcasted. Spectators viewed the increase in team members, beginning 
from broadcasting 60 000 members on January 1, 2019 and ending at 500 401 members on 
January 26, 2019 (Команда Зеленського, 2019). Other shapes in the images included the top 
right of the photo reading “Hello Ukraine” in blue and green and the top left reading “Ze! Team” 
in green and yellow. The composition of the photos was found to be assembled to provide 
national connotations through the incorporation of the colours blue and yellow, the colours of the 
Ukrainian flag. As such, the recruitment posts were marketed to spectators through shapes and 
colours to promote the notion that Zelensky’s campaign united the masses of Ukraine. 
 
The social media campaign conducted a mass publication of selfies of Zelensky with ‘Ze 
Team’ representatives. Approximately twenty selfies of Zelensky with ‘Ze Team’ representatives 
were uploaded onto Facebook and Instagram. The composition of the photos was the same, 
Zelensky grinning beside a smiling young team member in centre focus of the frame. The photos 
were in amateur format, providing the impression to spectators that Zelensky took the selfie 
himself. In addition, Zelensky is repeatedly viewed dressed casually in simplistic colours such as 
grey and beige, which directed the spectator’s focus on Zelensky and the ‘Ze Team’ member. 
Due to the photo composition being repeated, it produced a conveyed meaning to spectators. The 
emphasis of the photos was to convey progressiveness of Zelensky’s team in terms of the 
number of young and female party members, transparency of party members, in addition to 
Zelensky appearing to acknowledge and work alongside his fellow team members. Furthermore, 
the ‘raw’ footage of ‘Ze Team’ selfie photos marketed the idea that Zelensky’s campaign was 
structured to be forward-looking for Ukraine. 
 
A spectacle of photos of ‘Ze Team’ supporters was broadcasted across social media 
platforms. Discovered through empirical investigation was a number of photos featuring ‘Ze 
Team’ supporters in Ukraine, Poland, and Canada. In the case of ‘Ze Team’ enthusiasts in 
Ukraine, posts featured supporters either holding ‘Ze Team’ stickers, or branding their car, 
cellphone, or store with ‘Ze Team’ stickers. In each photo, the brightly coloured campaign 
sticker stood in focus in contrast to the dimly lit background. There were additional posted 
photos featuring ‘Ze Team’ supporters across Ukraine’s borders in Poland. The photos of ‘Ze 
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Team’ supporters in Poland all included brightly coloured campaign stickers spread across the 
table and posted on supporters’ laptops. Also uploaded were ‘Ze Team’ supporters and 
representatives in Canada. The posts showcased the ‘Ze Team’ office with representatives in 
Toronto, Canada. The broadcasted ‘Ze Team’ supporters included the Canadian-Ukrainian biker 
club ‘The Cossack’s’ sporting ‘Ze Team’ stickers on their biker club jackets. Through the 
analysis of photos, there was found emphasis on the expansion of ‘Ze Team’ support both 
nationally and internationally. Thus, through the showcasing of international support for ‘Ze 
Team’, Zelensky’s campaign appeared to be a unifying group for Ukrainian society.  
 
The premises and activities of ‘Ze Team’ members were publicized across social media. 
Social media campaign pages showcased a number of photos exhibiting the interior of the 
offices. The photos included repeated features: a desk with a laptop and chair, stickers and 
posters on the wall featuring Zelensky’s campaign quotes and slogans, and ‘Ze Team’ members 
working at their desks. It was found during analysis that the colour green was repeatedly applied, 
as the walls, campaign stickers, and posters were coloured green along with the furniture being 
green. In addition, the offices were furnished in minimalistic manner but in an organized fashion. 
The presentation of the offices provided the impression of ‘Ze Team’ being an organized and 
non-extravagant party. As well, the photos of the offices appeared to be taken by an amateur, due 
to the lack of quality of lighting, which promoted the idea to spectators that the photos were 
factual of how Zelensky’s campaign offices appeared. In addition, upon empirical investigation a 
number of the office photos featured the theme of technology. Such photos featured ‘Ze Team’ 
members working on laptops or cellphones. The notion of ‘Ze Team’ being digitalized was 
particularly advocated through imagery in the days preceding the first and second round of the 
election. A number of images featured ‘Ze Team’ members working to counter election fraud in 
bright focal view operating on their laptops or cellphones. Furthermore, upon analysis of photos 
featuring the ‘Ze Team’ offices and staff, Zelensky’s campaign marketed itself as a political 






3.1.3 The Green Movement 
 
Following the analysis of 1159 photos, two repeated patterns were identified in the 
images. The first pattern was the repeated incorporation of the colours blue, yellow, and green. 
Green was the principal colour of Zelensky’s social media campaign, which was found to be 
incorporated in the majority of social media posts. In addition, the colours blue and yellow were 
actively applied in social media images, which are the two colours of the Ukrainian flag. When 
the colours blue and yellow are combined together, it creates the colour green. The application of 
these three particular colours provided the implication that Ukraine, represented as the colours 
blue and yellow, blended together creates the colour green - ‘Ze Team.’ The second pattern 
identified was the notion of transparency in regard to ‘Ze Team’ activities through imagery. 
Numerous photos circulated across Zelensky’s social media accounts which featured ‘Ze Team’ 
members and supporters, ‘Ze Team’ offices, and ‘Ze Team’ members working. Thereby, 
Zelensky’s media campaign promoted the idea through images that Zelensky’s program was 
progressive through its efforts to be transparent. Furthermore, the circulated campaign images 
framed Zelensky’s green campaign as a united movement in creating national progress.    
 
3.2 Analysis of Posted Videos 
 
 
This section will analyze videos uploaded by Zelensky’s campaign onto social media. 
The videos analyzed were uploaded onto Zelensky’s social media campaign accounts of 
YouTube (50), Facebook (circa 295), and Instagram (circa 290). The videos under analysis were 
analyzed chronologically according to date of posting. Therefore, the videos analyzed from the 
first round of the election campaign (January 1 – March 31, 2019) were Zelensky’s campaign 
produced vlog series “Ze! President is the Servant of the People”, videos featuring Zelensky’s 
performances with the Kvartal 95 comedy tour and posted video clips from season 1 -3 of the 
television series Servant of the People. Videos analyzed from the second round of the election 
campaign (April 1 – April 21, 2019) were videos promoting the stadium debate. As for the vlog 
series “don’t f... up the elections”, it was investigated throughout the analysis as it was produced 
and posted during both rounds of the campaign. Furthermore, the analysis of circa 635 videos 
will particularly focus on uncovering themes that were progressively repeated and circulated 
during the first and second round of the campaign.  
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3.2.1 The First Round’s Opening Acts 
 
Scenes from past seasons of the television series Servant of the People were featured on 
the official campaign Instagram and Facebook pages. Early into the campaign, Zelensky’s 
campaign posted scenes from Servant of the People featuring Zelensky acting as President 
Holoborodko who was trying to bring change to the country. The video was posted in the first 
week of Zelensky’s campaign on January 7, 2019. In the video clip, the scene features President 
Holoborodko stating to a fellow politician how he believes Ukrainians should live: lower taxes, 
quick business registration, universal health care benefits, greater purchasing power. In second 
video posted on January 23, 2019, Zelensky is again acting as President Holoborodko who is 
avidly trying to reform the country’s infrastructure to be similar to its European neighbours but is 
prevented from endemic state corruption. The scene exposes how deficient Ukrainian roads are 
compared to neighbouring European states and the top-down corruption of Ukraine’s Ministry of 
Infrastructure. As for the third video posted on February 16,  2019, it starred two oligarchs 
creating a corrupt scheme that would make the Ukrainian taxpayers pay for the holes in their 
budget. The video ends with the message “March 2019” in reference to the first round of voting 
on March 31, 2019. Upon analysis, it is discovered that Zelensky’s campaign relied on assertions 
performed in the television scenes that held no basis if the performed statements were actually in 
fact part of Zelensky’s presidential program (Flyverbom & Reinecke, 2017, p. 1635). 
Accordingly, the television scene-spectacle portrayed to spectators that Zelensky’s campaign 
was parallel to Holoborodko’s performed presidency of trying to battle endemic state corruption. 
Thereby, by posting scenes from Servant of the People it contributed to formulating Zelensky’s 
undefined political orientation and ideology to correspond to the plot of the television series.   
 
The third season of the television series Servant of the People was promoted and released 
proceeding the first round of voting. In the months preceding the third season premiere, official 
campaign social media accounts showcased the filming of the series featuring scenes of Zelensky 
acting as Holoborodko. The early released scenes were featured in Zelensky’s vlog series “Ze! 
President is the Servant of the People” and across the campaign Facebook account exhibiting 
Zelensky repeatedly performing as Holoborodko. Found during observation was of the series 
trailer and episodes reinforcing the mirage of Zelensky’s presidential ambitions being equivalent 
to character Holoborodko’s. The plot of the third series featured Zelensky as Holoborodko 
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campaigning for President of Ukraine following a corruptive oligarch scheme which resulted in 
him losing his presidency and becoming incarcerated. The plot of the series was timely as scenes 
from the show featured many recognisable personalities from Ukrainian politics and premiered 
on March 27, 2019, days before the first-round of voting scheduled on March 31, 2019 (OSCE, 
2019, p. 25). Found through empirical research was that the majority of YouTube videos 
published on Zelensky’s campaign account following the third season’s airing contained links to 
full episodes of the third series. Furthermore, the analysis discovered that a strategy of 
Zelensky’s campaign was of reinforcing Zelensky’s image of character Holoborodko and 
merging his character performance with his presidential program. 
 
 The vlog series “Ze! President is the Servant of the People” showcased how Zelensky 
was just an ordinary man trying to become president. The 13-episode vlog series was published 
in the first round of the campaign between January 25 – March 14, 2019. Full episodes of the 
series were uploaded onto YouTube and clips of scenes were posted onto Facebook and 
Instagram. Each episode opened with two circles, one coloured blue and other yellow, coming 
from opposite directions and joining together in centre screen. As the circles came together, they 
created the colour green which read ““Ze! President is the Servant of the People”. Following the 
opening referencing Ukrainian unity being associated with Zelensky’s campaign, spectators of 
the series watched scenes showcasing Zelensky’s ‘daily life’: Zelensky’s 41st birthday 
celebration; shopping in the Odessa market; having tea with party members; conducting 
campaign meetings; comedic performances with the Kvartal 95 troupe; multiple clips of his daily 
workouts in the gym. Spectators watched Zelensky repeatedly dressed casually in scenes 
sporting baseball caps, jeans, sneakers, and workout clothes while chatting with either party 
members in meetings or citizens in the streets. Zelensky’s casual attire added to the visualization 
of Zelensky being an ordinary man trying to become president. Upon further interpretive 
investigation, it was found that there was particular emphasis on providing transparency of ‘Ze 
Team’ activities. Numerous scenes were filmed inside ‘Ze Team’ offices featuring Zelensky 
collaborating with ‘Ze Team’ members. As well, full scenes featured Zelensky conducting 
meetings with fellow team members and governmental bodies. Thus, it was found that through 
the exhibition of scenes of Zelensky’s life in the vlog series, an impression was created for 
spectators that Zelensky was transparent about his personal and professional activities on his 
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journey towards presidency. The vlog series was intended to gravitate spectator’s attention away 
from political orientations to be redirected through entertainment on Zelensky’s ‘life’ on the 
campaign trail. 
The Kvartal 95 comedy tour starring Zelensky was featured across the campaign’s social 
media pages. Kvartal 95’s national comedy tour was performed simultaneously during the first 
round of the election campaign. Scenes from the performances were featured in the vlog series 
“Ze! President is the Servant of the People” and on Facebook and Instagram, whereas the full 
Dnipro-Arena performance was accessible on YouTube. Following observation and 
interpretation of the videos, a repeated message was discovered in the performances - Ukraine 
was a divided society and needed to be re-united. This message was reinforced through the use 
of symbols in performances. A number of performances included child performers, symbolizing 
future, dressed in the symbolic colour of peace - white. In addition, Zelensky and Kvartal 95 
performers repeatedly encouraged audiences to lift two fingers in the air to make the peace sign 
together. Each concert ended with a patriotic song accompanied with a slide show of images of 
united moments in Ukraine’s national contemporary history. Such images included ‘The Act of 
Declaration of Independence of Ukraine’ and prideful moments in the Olympic Games.  
Following the analysis, it is understood that the Kvartal 95 performances created a spectacle to 
selectively bring into vision what the troupe wanted to show - Zelensky as the President of 
Ukraine would be the provider of peace and national unity. 
 
Audience members attending the Kvartal 95 performances were featured in video clips. 
Mass numbers attended the Kvartal-95 concerts, ranging from hundreds filling the seats of local 
theatres to as large as 15,000 people occupying an arena (Carroll, 2019). Camera angles 
produced views in the “Ze! President is the Servant of the People” vlog series highlighting the 
large theatres and arenas being filled by audiences. It should be noted that the large number of 
audiences may have been partly due to the first afternoon performance being free, and the second 
night-time performance being a charged event (ODIHR, 2019, p. 17). While the camera focused 
in on audiences ranging in age from toddler to pensioner, social media spectators watched 
audiences either cheer along with Zelensky and the performers or saddened by performances that 
referred to national corruption and war. Also highlighted were audience members dressed in 
green with cellphones branded with “Ze Team” stickers in support of Zelensky’s campaign. 
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Identified in the video clips of the performances was the notion that Zelensky brings people of all 
demographics together; thereby, he was a unifying factor of Ukrainian society. 
 
The vlog series “don’t f... up the elections” provided the practice aspects of voting. The 
series produced twenty episodes featuring Kvartal 95 performer Ruslan Hanumak as the host. 
The vlog series was published between January 31 – April 19, 2019 across the campaign 
accounts of YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram. The majority of the videos were posted in the 
first round of the election (13 videos) compared to the second round (7 videos). The series was 
posted in the format of short motivational videos explaining the practical aspects of voting such 
as how to register, check yourself in the lists, possible voting obstacles, etc. (Burmahin, Dutsyk, 
Kuzmenko, & Lurkova, 2019, p. 45).  It was greatly emphasized in the vlog the importance of 
voting and the negative implications of either not voting or voting with incomplete registration. 
The videos were discovered to target youth audiences due to the basic information provided on 
voting and the language and demeanour of the host Hanumak. Though, it should be noted that 
the videos did not provide information on how president’s powers nor on how to make an 
informed choice when voting (Burmahin, Dutsyk, Kuzmenko, & Lurkova, 2019, p. 45). 
Therefore, the repeated message emphasized in the videos was that in order to change the present 
governmental system one must vote in the presidential elections. As such, the vlog series 
directed spectators’ attention to the importance of voting to change the governmental system, 
reducing focus on Zelensky’s abilities and plans as president.  
 
3.2.2 The Second Round’s Grand Finale 
 
A series of video debate challenges conducted by Zelensky’s campaign in the second 
round of election circulated across social media. The first video challenge was released on April 
3, 2019 on the official Facebook and YouTube accounts of Zelensky’s campaign, gaining 2.7 
million views and 1.5 million views respectively. The video was found to be professionally 
constructed, which included a dramatic soundtrack and the camera focusing on Zelensky in nine 
different camera angles. The video concluded with Zelensky giving his opponent, incumbent 
President Poroshenko, ‘24 hours to decide’ whether to accept the ‘debate challenge’ at Kyiv’s 
Olympic Stadium (Euronews, 2019). Adding to the spectacle was the live video countdown 
clock featured on Zelensky’s campaign Facebook page commencing at 24:00:00 on April 3 
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which gathered 403 500 views (Команда Зеленського, 2019). Poroshenko participated in the 
spectacle by accepting Zelensky’s ‘debate challenge’ by posting a ‘challenge acceptance’ video 
on his personal Twitter account before the twenty-four hours ran out (Петро Порошенко, 2019). 
Zelensky further added to the media-spectacle by asking third-place contender and former Prime 
Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko to host the stadium debate between Poroshenko and 
Zelensky. The video appeal uploaded on Zelensky’s official campaign Facebook and YouTube 
accounts both received one million views (Зе! Президент, 2019; Команда Зеленського, 2019). 
In the video, Zelensky requested Tymoshenko to be ‘the guarantor of honest rules,’  providing 
her the same deadline as Poroshenko - ‘24 hours to decide’ (Зе! Президент, 2019; Команда 
Зеленського, 2019). Tymoshenko declined to partake in the spectacle by rejecting the position 
to be the host of the stadium debate. The colorful social-media video exchange dominated media 
coverage of the presidential election. It was found that the videos distracted spectators from 
discussing the candidate’s policy and rather redirected the spectators focus to the media-
spectacle designed to subdue social criticisms (Rohozinska & Shpak, 2019, p. 39; Kersten & 
Abbott, 2012, p. 324). Thereby, interpreted from Zelensky’s debate-challenge videos was 
Zelensky’s campaign strategy of creating a media-spectacle to subdue discussion on his political 
platform and ideology by spectators. 
 
The campaign media-spectacle in the leadup to the stadium debate included video live-
streaming of Poroshenko and Zelensky taking blood tests. In Zelensky’s video debate-challenge 
to Poroshenko, he created the debate condition of compulsory medical checks to ensure 
spectators that no alcoholics nor drug addicts would be present at the debate. Ensued was the live 
airing of Poroshenko and Zelensky’s medical tests. Camera crews accompanied the presidential 
candidates into the medical room, allowing spectators to watch the presidential candidates 
having their blood drawn (Двадцять Чотири Канал, 2019; Телеканал ZIK, 2019). The 
procedure of the blood tests was fully captured on live video and broadcasted across multiple 
media platforms. Zelensky’s media campaign created a bandwagon effect as the stadium debate 
turned into the most discussed topic amongst Ukrainian television channels (OSCE, 2019). 
Interpreted from the live-streaming of the blood tests was the intentional creation of a media-
spectacle by Zelensky’s campaign for the purpose of drawing in audience’s attention to the 
entertainment surrounding the stadium debate rather than to political platforms. 
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The stadium debate was held in a spectacle format. Instead of participating in the studio 
of a public news broadcaster, Zelensky’s campaign organized the debate in an unprecedented 
format at the Kyiv Olympic Stadium on Friday, April 19th. (CANADEM, 2019, p. 24; Burmahin, 
Dutsyk, Kuzmenko, & Lurkova, 2019, p. 20). The debate was live streamed in video format on 
Zelensky’s campaign accounts of Facebook and YouTube which gained 498 900 and over one 
million spectators respectively, in addition to the estimated 22,000-person audience at the debate 
(Команда Зеленського, 2019; Зе! Президент, 2019; OSCE, 2019, p. 19). These figures do not 
account for the number of spectators from Ukrainian public media, as the debate was live 
streamed on most major Ukrainian television networks, as well as broadcasted on radio and 
online (CANADEM, 2019, p. 24). Visually observed was the debate itself formatted as a sports 
match with the event commencing with the flipping of a coin to determine who will start the 
debate. Zelensky’s demeanour when speaking was interpreted as a performance, due to the 
multiple instances of himself showing peace signs to the crowd accompanied by passionate and 
rehearsed speeches. Thus, it is concluded following analyzation that the stadium debate was 
formatted by Zelensky’s campaign to be an entertaining event rather than an informative political 
debate. As such, Zelensky used his entertainment career to benefit his political career by 
applying celebrity politics (Schultz, 2001). Thereby, the stadium debate was a spectacular 
performance with framed focus on the events surrounding the debate and the format of the 
debate rather than focusing on actual political discussions. 
 
3.2.3 The Acted Program  
 
 The videos posted in Zelensky’s social media campaign progressively filled in the gaps 
of Zelensky’s undefined presidential program. Neither Zelensky’s campaign nor Zelensky 
himself produced clear messages on his presidential program and its policies on key issues such 
as national defence, foreign policy, cooperation with international organizations including 
NATO and the IMF, nor on countering Russian aggression in Donbass (Burmahin, Dutsyk, 
Kuzmenko, & Lurkova, 2019, p. 46). Rather, through performativity the presidential program 
emphasized its plan on countering endemic state corruption and bringing change to Ukraine. As 
such, the videos in Zelensky’s campaign progressively completed the presidential program 
through a produced spectacle. Essentially, Zelensky’s campaign supplemented his lack of 
comprehensive political strategy with rehearsed performances. 
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3.3 Discourse Analysis on Campaign Language  
 
 
This section will apply discourse analysis on the application of language by Zelensky’s 
campaign.  First, the analysis will be applied оn spoken language during Zelensky’s performance 
to uncover linguistic messages. The particular spoken language under analysis derives from 
Zelensky’s performances with the Kvartal 95 troupe as well as from Zelensky’s performance at 
the stadium debate. Second, the analysis will be conducted on campaign slogans and hashtags 
identified in postings on Instagram and Facebook. Ultimately, the analysis is applied in effort to 
dismantle the messages spoken during Zelensky’s performances and written social media posts 
to uncover the impact his language use made on mobilizing support from spectators.  
 
3.3.1 Spoken Language 
 
The Kvartal 95 national comedy tour featured a number of spoken acts referencing 
Zelensky’s campaign. The linguistic performances took the form of comedy skits, singing, and 
speeches. One particular comedy act performed at the Dnipro-Arena raised attention while 
conducting discourse analysis. The comedy skit showcased Zelensky requiring a ‘body double’ 
since Zelensky ‘will be president’ as stated by one Kvartal 95 performer. In the skit, Zelensky 
questioned the body double’s response in the case of bribes. As Zelensky bribed the ‘body 
double,’ beginning from one million dollars and ending at twenty million dollars, the ‘body 
double’ succeeded the challenge by refusing every bribe (Зе! Президент, 2019). Thus, it was 
uncovered that a particular message was promoted and narrated in the comedy skit, which was 
that Zelensky would be an incorruptible President of Ukraine. 
 
 The lyrics of songs sung by Zelensky along with the Kvartal 95 troupe vocalized the 
narrative of Ukraine being a divided society. The song ‘My girl’ was performed with altered 
lyrics emphasising the great division within Ukraine exemplified by the current War in Donbass 
(Зе! Президент, 2019). The troupe also performed the song ‘I love my Motherland’, containing 
lyrics reinforcing the necessity for national unity. This message was emphasized through such 
lyrics as, “the country is divided again,” “I simply want to live in a world with peace,” “There 
are hopes of Maidan again,” and “I have no government” (Зе! Президент, 2019). Another song 
performed emphasized the united pursuit to remove corrupt politicians and oligarchs: “We’ve 
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had enough, they’re disgraces, we’re the ones going places, just say no to their faces” (Zhegulev 
& Kohen, 2019). Also performed along with child performers was “Life is Beautiful”, which 
narrated the possible post-election outcome of a bright future for Ukraine with Zelensky as 
President of Ukraine: “Year 2019, April 1, just imagine and believe that everything you wished 
for came true” (Zhegulev & Kohen, 2019). As for the performed song “The Country that our 
Children will be Proud of,” the lyrics referred to a future Ukraine filled with national pride and 
peace (Зе! Президент, 2019).  Upon executing discourse analysis, found was produced 
spectacles narrating Zelensky’s presidential program. Zelensky applied his performance image to 
produce spectacles of himself through theatrical practices to narrate a particular organizational 
reality into existence (Alvesson, 2013). As such, Zelensky and Kvartal 95 performers narrated to 
the spectators through spectacle-performances of Zelensky being the future provider of peace 
and prosperity for the Ukrainian nation as President of Ukraine.  
 
The stadium debate was filled with spoken narratives of how Zelensky would be as 
President of Ukraine. Identified through discourse analysis was the repeatedly spoken message 
by Zelensky that he as president would bring only enormous positivity to Ukrainian society. 
Though, details of the presidential program were absent from Zelensky’s speeches, instead 
Zelensky made sweeping statements in reference to his program: “We will do everything we can 
to end the war (Ruptly, 2019).” So, Zelensky created a debate-spectacle which united the 
audience in their national wishes as Zelensky performed to be the man who would break 
Ukraine’s corrupt governmental system. Through speech, Zelensky also presented himself as an 
opponent to corruption: “I’m not a politician, I’m just a person, a simple person, who came here 
to break the system - to destroy the system (Ruptly, 2019).” Further emphasizing the massive 
corruption within the state, Zelensky described his opponent Poroshenko as, “Two Poroshenko’s 
- the first is the expert in front of the cameras and the second is a corrupt politician behind the 
cameras” (Ruptly, 2019). The rhetoric of Zelensky’s affirmative pursuit to end systemic 
corruption continued as the debate progressed by claiming the following to Poroshenko: “I am 
not your opponent; I am your sentence” (Ruptly, 2019). Performing as the ‘true representative of 
the people,’ Zelensky asked Poroshenko questions created by the spectators which were 
submitted via social media posts. The majority of the questions he applied at the debate were 
claimed to be ‘from the people,’ as he asserted repeatedly each time before reading his list of 
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questions to Poroshenko. The aforementioned remark cemented the message of Zelensky being a 
man of the people - for the people. As shown in the included quotes, Zelensky linguistically 
crafted himself as embodying alacrity. Debord described the spectacle as the institution of 
‘enormous positivity’ in which ‘everything that appears is good’ (Debord, 1994, p. 15). Thus, 
Zelensky’s language had a performative function to portray himself as an ordinary man who as 
president would break the corrupt governmental system.  
 
The format of the stadium debate being spectacularized pacified criticism of Zelensky’s 
presidential platform. Spectacular events, such as the stadium debate, are designed to subdue 
social criticisms by redirecting the spectator’s attention to the spectacle (Kersten & Abbott, 
2012). As such, the structure of both Zelensky’s debate performance and the debate itself 
provided limited opportunity for the deconstruction of his presidential program and subdued the 
ability to think critically on Zelensky’s presidential program. In addition, the format of the event 
offered limited opportunity for spectators to compare the presidential platforms of the candidates 
and familiarize themselves with Zelensky’s programmes (OSCE, 2019, p. 5-6). Also, since the 
debate took place 36 hours before the second-round election day on April 21st, it did not allow 
for sufficient time for a fulsome and meaningful discussion on the issues and positions raised by 
the candidates (CANADEM, 2019, p. 10).  Consequently, the spectacular debate subdued 
criticism on Zelensky’s undefined platform and instead mobilized spectators into Zelensky’s 
media spectacle. 
 
3.3.2 Posted Language 
 
The name of the television series Servant of the People was the source of Zelensky’s 
campaign slogan “Ze! President is the Servant of the People.” The initial application of the 
slogan was on the first day of Zelensky’s campaign on January 1, 2019. The slogan was included 
in the centre of the photo in which Zelensky is featured acting as character Holoborodko dressed 
in a suit and walking with a briefcase as described in section 3.1.1. The slogan was later branded 
across multiple photos which feature Zelensky posted on social media. Upon analysis, ‘Ze! 
President’ is found to refer to Zelensky as President of Ukraine and the title of ‘Servant of the 
People’ is derived from the television series in which Zelensky acted as the protagonist hero 
Holoborodko. 
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The slogan “Ze! President is the Servant of the People” was also applied as the title of 
one of the campaign vlog series. The thirteen-episode vlog series featured across social media 
(YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram) was intended to be transparent on Zelensky’s journey to 
presidency while Zelensky remained uncorrupt: 
 
“You will see everything: Who we are, how we prepare our election program, how we 
assemble a team and even how we look for money. And most importantly - how to 
become president and still remain human!” (Зе! Президент, 2019) 
 
 
After applying discourse analysis on the application of the slogan “Ze! President is the Servant 
of the People” to photos and the vlog series, it was found that the language reference attached the 
theme of the television series Servant of the People to Zelensky’s campaign program. The 
particular theme was of an ordinary man becoming president and eradicating state corruption. 
Thus, Zelensky’s campaign referenced the cultivated media image of the protagonist hero of the 
television series to Zelensky’s presidential personality. Thereby, the slogan narrated to the 
spectators how Zelensky as President of Ukraine would be an ordinary man fighting against state 
corruption. 
 
The main hashtag of Zelensky’s campaign was #Letsdoittogether (Let’s do it together). 
The hashtag was used throughout the campaign with its first application on January 7, 2019 
(Команда Зеленського, 2019). The hashtag #Letsdoittogether accompanied the majority of 
social media posts on Instagram and Facebook with reference to building the campaign including 
the presidential program, campaign billboards, and deciding who to assign the positions of Prime 
Minister of Ukraine and Head of the Security Service. The first case of Zelensky’s application of 
the hashtag was on January 8, 2019 in the video captioned, “Our Program. Step 1. Let’s do it 
Together!” in which he asked upon the audience to build the presidential program with him. The 
post received 5 000 comments with viewers providing their input on the presidential program. 
Upon the release of the presidential program on January 25, 2019, Zelensky’s campaign again 
appealed to the audience, receiving 13 000 comments from spectators:  
 
“Comment, offer your ideas! This is important, because together we will be able to 
achieve the main goal - to build the Ukraine of our dreams! #Letsdoittogether!”  
(Команда Зеленського, 2019)  
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The phrase of ‘building the Ukraine of our dreams’ accompanied by the hashtag 
#Letsdoittogether was frequently posted across social media. Particularly it was posted in 
reference to encouraging voting during:  
 
“March 31 make the right choice! Create a dream country for the next generations. Create a 
country that you will be proud of and in which you want to live! Let's do it together!” 
(Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
 
“April 21 is a decisive choice! On this day, be sure to come to your polling station and cast 
your vote to build a dream country for the next 5 years!🔥 #Letsdoittogether”  
(Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
 
          As demonstrated in the above posts, Zelensky’s campaign encouraged through direct 
language and hashtags for people to vote in both rounds of the election. The found underlying 
reference of ‘building a dream country’ refers to ending the corrupt governmental system 
through the removal of corrupt political elites and oligarchs.  
 
The hashtag #Letsdoittogether was also applied as means to crowdsource questions from 
spectators to bring to the stadium debate. Prior to the stadium debate in the second round of the 
election, Zelensky called upon spectators to provide him questions to ask Poroshenko at the 
debate on April 19, 2019. Facebook and YouTube were the applied media platforms for 
crowdsourcing questions for Zelensky. Though, Zelensky’s YouTube vlog series “Ze! President 
is the Servant of the People” and “don’t f... up the elections” also contained links to the official 
website of Zelensky’s campaign where spectators could post questions for Zelensky to ask 
Poroshenko at the debate. An example of one of many posts encouraging audience to provide 
questions is the following:  
 
“What question would you like to ask Poroshenko? Write in comments! 
#Letsdoittogether!” (Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
 
The above post received 14 000 comments from spectators. Zelensky’s informal communication 
style on equal terms of the audience contributed to the active involvement of audience 
communication through the comment section (Burmahin, Dutsyk, Kuzmenko, & Lurkova, 2019, 
p. 20 - 21).  
 49 
The discourse of promoting spectators’ advocacy was promoted throughout the 
campaign. In an interview between Mikhail Fedorov, the main digital strategist of Zelensky’s 
presidential campaign, and the internet television station Hromadske, Fedorov claimed that each 
stage of the campaign was maximally tuned to engage spectators (Кутєпов, 2019). As such, 
online competitions were created and advertised on Facebook and Instagram:   
 
“Zelensky's team supports the world record of selfies! Join! #Letsdoittogether!”  
(Ze Team 2019, 2019) 
 
A number of online competitions followed such as ‘The Best Fake’, ‘Become an Election 
observer’, ‘World Record of Selfies’ due in part to the explosion of a mediatized selfie culture. 
People embrace spectacular self-production in the selfie culture (Flyverbom & Reinecke, 2017). 
Therefore, according to digital strategist Fedorov, the online campaign competitions led to a 
great increase in audience numbers according to digital strategist Fedorov (Кутєпов, 2019). 
 
3.3.3 The True Servant of the People 
 
A discovered tactic of Zelensky’s campaign was building his political position around his 
television personality. Following completion of discourse analysis on spoken and posted 
language, discovered was a circulated and all-encompassing message. This message being that 
Zelensky was an ordinary man who was trying to eradicate Ukraine’s troubles of corruption and 
war. Though, this message is framed from his character personality from the television series 
Servant of the People and not based on his undefined political ideology. As such, Zelensky’s 
campaign vocabulary, applied through an acted humble demeanour, presented himself as an 
average and uncorrupt man. As for the published posts they referred to directly to the television 
series Servant of the People (Ze! Is the Servant of the People). As well, the posts refereed to 
themes from his character personality (building a dreamed Ukraine). Therefore, the language of 
Zelensky’s campaign aligned his political position to his character personality’s actions in the 
television series Servant of the People. 
 
A strategy of Zelensky’s campaign was building communication with audience through 
social media. Zelensky’s campaign encouraged the audience to become active participants within 
the spectacle stage of social media. By soliciting for spectators’ input through social media in 
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engaging ways, spectators were succumbed to the notion that through participation in Zelensky’s 
campaign they could create change within the system. Thereby, the campaign strategy of 
creating an interactive spectacle through posted language within Zelensky’s campaign further 
integrated the spectator into the spectacle. In the context of Zelensky’s campaign, Zelensky’s 
social media posts called upon the audience for their opinion and feedback regarding the 
direction of his campaign. By listening to the ‘people’ rather than the ‘experts’ it created the 
illusion to spectators of their possession of agency within the spectacle due to the reason that 
individuals develop a sense of involvement in the process of making political decisions when 
communicating with politicians through social networks (Konstantynivska, 2019). Thus, 
discovered was Zelensky’s campaign tactic of promoting the spectator’s creativity and emotions 
while leading them to believe they have agency within his campaign (Arvidsson, 2005). Thereby, 
Zelensky’s campaign increased the pervasiveness of the spectacle by means of linguistically 
promoting participation from the spectators.  
 
3.4 Reoccurring Themes 
 
 
In this section, it will be elaborated the recurrent themes found within Zelensky’s social 
media campaign and how they were mapped. Particularly described are the two recurrent themes 
identified and mapped: spectacle and social movement. The two themes were found to be 
promoted simultaneously through images, videos, and language throughout the election. Thus, 
the following section will elaborate the ways in which Zelensky’s campaign can be categorized 
under the themes of spectacle and social movement in order to make the justified claim that 
Zelensky’s campaign was a spectacular social movement. 
 
The theme of spectacle was identified following the application of qualitative content 
analysis and discourse analysis of postings uploaded onto social media platforms (YouTube, 
Facebook, Instagram). It was uncovered that Zelensky’s campaign conducted a performative 
style of politics though spectacles. The first spectacle uncovered was paralleling the plot of the 
television series Servant of the People to his presidential campaign platform. It was further 
paralleled with the promotion and release of the series third season. As well, found was the mass 
circulation of selfie formatted photos and videos. A number of photos and videos released by 
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Zelensky’s media campaign were taken by Zelensky himself in ‘selfie style’.  Selfie format 
allowed for him to speak directly to the camera and in turn provided the impression that he was 
speaking directly to the spectators. In addition, the ‘selfie format’ in photos and videos provided 
‘native’ footage of Zelensky’s campaign activities, formulating the performance of Zelensky 
looking and speaking directly to the people as he was a ‘man of the people.’ Adding to the 
findings was Zelensky’s filmed performances in the vlog series “Ze! President in the Servant of 
the People” which featured selected scenes of Zelensky’s activities during the campaign. Adding 
to the theme of spectacle was Zelensky’s acts during the Kvartal 95 comedy tour and the stadium 
debate, which through singing, acting and speeches brought into vision a particular rehearsed 
view of Zelensky. As such, Zelensky’s campaign conducted numerous spectacles formatted in 
non-traditional campaign methods. 
 
The discovered theme of social movement was also identified following the application of 
qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis on social media posts. It was identified the 
repeated application of the colours green, yellow, and blue. The colours blue and yellow, the 
same colours of the Ukrainian flag, were visualized blended together in campaign YouTube 
videos to create the colour green - the official colour of Zelensky’s campaign. This repeated 
visualized imagery provided the impression to spectators that Zelensky’s campaign unites the 
masses of Ukrainian society. In addition, found was the continual uploading of images and 
videos ‘Ze Team’s’ office activities, promoting the notion of party transparency, which was 
novel to Ukraine’s political arena. Adding to the novelty was the publicizing of the international 
expansion of ‘Ze Team’ support, creating the impression that ‘Ze Team’ was a large movement 
for social change. Adding to the notion of change, was the vlog series “don’t f... up the elections” 
which encouraged spectators to vote by means of educational videos. Adding to the theme of 
social movement were spoken utterances during the Kvartal 95 comedy tour and stadium debate 
that promoted the perception that Zelensky would bring an end to corruption and the War in 
Donbas found after discourse analysis. This discourse was further advocated through the 






4. Zelensky & Populism 
 
 
4.1 The Populist and the Spectacle 
 
 
Social media platforms, the dominant element of Zelensky’s media campaign, has an 
ever-increasing presence in contemporary politics. As social media has grown in prominence in 
mass media, so has its prominence in its application in the political sphere due to its ability to 
provide increased communication between people (Stratton, 2018, p. 21). As such, 
social media is found to be a capable tool for mobilizing citizens for political activeness during 
electoral campaigns (Jakubowski, 2020). Through social media, users are integrated into the 
spectacle through more engaging ways through such means as soliciting viewers opinions and 
online competitions (Best & Kellner, 1999). The social media platforms applied in Zelensky’s 
media campaign, are found to be particular locations for political mobilization.  
 
            The engaging ability of social media has provided a new territory for populist activities. 
This has led to an increasing number of papers in the past decade on the relationship between 
social media and populism (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016; Dittrich, 2017; Khosravinik, 
2017; Schumann, Boer, Hanke, & Liu, 2019). Jakub Jakubowski (2020) found that since the 
internet has developed into an interactive medium with limited control over content, social media 
platforms have become an excellent channel for the spreading of populist messages (p. 123). 
Also uncovered is that social media provides populists that ability to apply diverse 
communication techniques to express their particular interests (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; 
Jakubowski, 2020). Thus, social media has been found to significantly enhance the dissemination 
of populist messages (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016). In addition, Moffitt and Tormey 
(2013) add that populist communication style contains repertoires of performance to create 
political relations. As such, performances are incorporated into populist communication due to 
the strong perlocutionary effects of performances as outlined by Judith Butler’s performativity. 
Therefore, populist performance style is manifested in multiple means including social media, as 
is allows for the establishment of relations between political actors and citizens (Jakubowski, 
2020). Thus, this next section will investigate how Zelensky’s communicative style on social 
media platforms disseminated populist messages to mobilize campaign support. 
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4.1.1 Shared Elements 
Populist’s performative style shares common elements with Guy Debord’s spectacle. 
According to Meghan Sutherland (2012), certain techno-economic relations which produce the 
spectacle contain shared aesthetic elements which produce populist rhetoric (Sutherland, 2012). 
The conditions and characteristics which are present in both the spectacle and populism are: the 
existence and emphasis of ‘the people’; emphasis on the production of social unity that is 
predicated on societal separation; the presence of a spectacle. In the subsequent section, the 
elements of populist’s performative style and the spectacle will be outlined in effort to determine 
how Zelensky’s spectacular social movement incorporated populist stylistic traits of 
communication in its spectacle.  
Both populist communication and Debord’s spectacle depend on ‘the people’ for 
existence. In the case of populism, ‘the society’ and ‘the people’ do not exist as a a coherent 
formation. Thus, populism comes into existence as ‘the people’ form together into an internal 
frontier against the institutional system (Laclau, 2005, p. 73-74; 94-99). As the people form their 
demands, a charismatic leader arises as the ‘true representative’ of ‘the people’ who is purposed 
to fulfill the demands of ‘the people’. In the case of the spectacle, the concept was produced to 
describe commodity’s totalizing dominance on the social system that was predicated on 
submission and conformity of ‘the people’ (Debord, 1995, p. 26). The mechanism in which ‘the 
people’ are interpellated into such subjects is ‘the spectacle’ (Teurlings, 2013, p. 515). 
Furthermore, the two concepts require ‘the people’ for existence. Expanding into the case of 
Zelensky’s campaign, the audiences of his social media and performance campaign became ‘the 
people’ through spectatorship. Zelensky mobilized ‘the people’ as those who wanted to ‘break 
the corrupt system’ in order to ‘build the Ukraine of their dreams’ that was absent of oligarchs 
and corruption. As such, ‘the people’ described as ‘spectators’ in Chapter 3 were a crucial 
component in Zelensky’s campaign communication.  
Social unity is emphasized both in populist communication and within the spectacle. 
Debord described capitalist society as predicated on separation with the spectacle being the 
producer of social unity within the society (Sutherland, 2012, p.336). In order to create social 
unity, the spectacle is an institution of an ‘enormous positivity’ in which ‘everything that appears 
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is good and whatever is good will appear’ in the spectacle (Debord, 1994, p. 15). Consequently, 
the spectators become a part of the spectacle which, “consists in the reunification of separate 
aspects at the level of the image” (Jappe & Nicholson-Smith, 1999, p. 6-7). Whereas, the rhetoric 
of populist actors is emphasizing their ability to unite the existing differences within the society. 
The base of populist formation is the emotional investment made by ‘the people’ under the 
prospect of social unity (Sutherland, 2012, p. 331). In regard to Zelensky’s campaign, he 
emphasized his ability to bring social unity through the consistently applied campaign hashtag 
#letsdoittogether. Moreover, Zelensky portrayed himself as a charismatic leader through social 
media postings and live performances who could unite Ukrainian society to overthrow the 
corruptive oligarchs and political elites and ultimately provide a better future for the nation.  
The spectacle itself is an element of populist communication. According to Ernesto 
Laclau (2005), the spectacle in populism is formed as a result of a charismatic figure articulating 
the politics of ‘the people’ to the audience by means of a performance. Thus, the figure 
essentially creates a spectacle of himself by means of an entertainment spectacle or through 
performances in the form of political rallies (Sutherland, 2012, p. 342-343). The figure draws in 
audiences to spectacles on account of their broadly affective visual appeals, generally in the form 
of live performances or through an online presence on social media platforms (Sutherland, 2012, 
p. 333). In regard to Zelensky’s campaign, the spectacle was a crucial stylistic element and 
communication tactic of the campaign.  
 
4.1.2 Performed Populism  
 
Populists apply social media to mobilize the masses for support. It has been found that 
populism manifests itself in a fragmented form on social media following theoretical discussions 
and empirical analysis (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016, p. 1109-1110). Accordingly, 
populist actors apply social media as it provides them the freedom to articulate and spread their 
messages as the platform serves as a direct linkage to the people (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & 
Büchel, 2016, p. 1109-1110). In addition, the medium of social media allows for short acerbic 
messages that are more personal and sensationalistic (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016, p. 
1113). As a result, social media is a convenient instrument to spread populist’s style of 
communication through the five common elements of populism: emphasizing the sovereignty of 
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the people, advocating for the people, attacking the elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the 
‘heartland’ (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016, p. 1109). In regard to Zelensky’s campaign, 
it will be analyzed which of the five elements of populism were manifested in his social media 
campaign through the application of post-structuralism and discourse analysis. Post-structuralism 
will be applied in effort to analyze how the application of Zelensky’s language through postings 
and performances created a particular image of himself. Thereby, through the utilization of post-
structuralism, it will be highlighted how Zelensky’s campaign language constructed a particular 
image through populist rhetoric. Whereas discourse analysis will be applied to analyze the 
language in postings and spoken language to help explain how Zelensky’s media phenomenon 
mobilized spectators through the application of populist linguistic elements. Specifically 
analyzed will be the linguistic elements of the campaign accessible through the official social 
media campaign accounts: social media posts, presidential program, and performed speech from 
the stadium debate. Ultimately, the subsequent section will determine how Zelensky conducted a 
populist stylistic campaign through his social media campaign tactics.  
Populist rhetoric generally contains claims by the populist agent on restoring the 
sovereignty of ‘the people.’ According to populist accusations, the elites deprive ‘the people’ of 
their right to practice sovereignty; thus, the populist agent claims to be one of the only actors in 
society capable of restoring the sovereignty of ‘the people.’ Sovereignty is restored by populist 
actors under the claim of, “replacing the elite and all other representative and intermediary 
institutions (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016, p. 1111). In the case of Zelensky’s 
campaign, he advocated for sovereignty of his spectators by means of structuring his social 
media campaign to encompass participation and direct engagement. In the following post, 
Zelensky emphasized for direct communication between himself and his audience:  
“It's really important for us to know your opinion. More than that, during the week 
Vladimir will personally review every point of view.”  
(Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
In the latter post, Zelensky appealed to his spectators in manner which advocated for the 
audience’s agency while placing the audiences’ needs to be of optimal importance to his 
campaign. Therefore, the text illustrates Zelensky’s perceived concentration on the popular 
grievances of Ukrainian society. As such, Zelensky linguistically appeared to be a ‘man of the 
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people,’ which was accentuated during the stadium debate. Prior to the debate, Zelensky 
appealed directly to the audience via social media for questions to ask Poroshenko at the stadium 
debate. Zelensky’s apparent usage of ‘the people’s’ questions at the debate portrayed his as a 
direct representative of his spectators: 
“I have a question for you Mr. Poroshenko. It is from the people of Ukraine which they 
asked me to ask you on the Internet.” (Ruptly, 2019) 
Through direct appeal to the spectators by bypassing intermediary channels through social media 
platforms, Zelensky was capable of mobilizing voters’ individual engagement. Thus, Zelensky’s 
campaign through the language of posts and speeches promoted a sense of direct representation, 
which is one of the features of populist leadership (Kudelia, 2019).  
 
In addition, Zelensky advocated for ‘the people’s’ sovereignty in his presidential program 
by promoting direct democracy. Through postings on social media platforms, Zelensky asked 
spectators directly for ‘Ze Team’ representatives in order to orchestrate direct democratic 
methods. In the subsequent post, Zelensky encourages the practice of direct democracy through 
online communication:  
 
No more nepotism and sideline appointments for office. Democracy in Ukraine must 
become a reality with you. Offer worthy and authoritative professionals who can help Ze! 
team build a ‘Dream Country.’ Fill out the questionnaire on 
http://clc.to/zedream_team/ and tag the best in the comments. With your 
recommendations, we will find professional and experienced people.  
(Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
 
As well as backing direct communication with audiences, written in Zelensky’s 
presidential program, which was circulated across his social media pages (Facebook and 
Instagram) was his advocacy for direct democracy. The first bill to be passed with Zelensky as 
president proclaimed to increase the application of referendums. Essentially, Zelensky demanded 




“My first bill: ‘On democracy.’ In it, we will together establish a mechanism by which 
only the People of Ukraine will form the main tasks for the government through 
referendums and other forms of direct democracy.” (Ze! Команда, 2019) 
 
Zelensky’s embracement of instruments for direct rule created the illusion through language of 
exercising popular sovereignty by which Ukrainians could “set the main tasks for the authorities” 
(Kudelia, 2019). This bill exemplifies how Zelensky emphasized for sovereignty of the people 
through concrete forms.  
 
A common characteristic of populist actors is performing the act of advocacy. Generally, 
populist actors perform the act of advocacy through emphasis of being the ‘true representative of 
the people.’ ‘The people’ are usually a homogeneous group described as, “inherently pure, good, 
and paramount” (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016, p. 1111). The target audience of 
Zelensky’s campaign was the Ukrainian people who did not identify with corrupt oligarchs nor 
with the political elites. Occasionally, populist actors apply a rhetorical expression to replace ‘the 
people.’ For Zelensky, his metaphor was the hashtag #letsdoittogether which became the official 
hashtag of Zelensky’s campaign as incorporated in the following two posts: 
 
We are already over 490 000! Imagine, 490 000 people who have the same goal, similar 
views, healthy ambition. People who are ready to conquer mountains. People who are 
sure that to change the country it can only be done together. This is unreal cool! Don't 
stand away, join Ze! Team….  Join me! Let’s do it together  
(Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
 
You are conscious that your most important mission on March 31 is to come and cast a 
vote for a worthy one! Everyone understands that the system prepares falsification, we 
have to break the system - every vote is important! Only together we can build a dream 
country! Let's do it together (Ze Team 2019, 2019)  
 
In the first post, the hashtag was applied as a means to recruit the audience for the mission of 
changing Ukraine ‘together’ through ‘Ze Team’ membership. As for the second post, it was 
applied to encourage the audience to vote in the first round of the election in order to change the 
country ‘together.’ In both posts, the hashtag was applied as means to create the impression 
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through language that Zelensky stands ‘together’ with the entire country and all its inhabitants to 
remove the endemically corrupt system of governance. Thereby, the hashtag can be regarded as a 
personal action frame and leaves it to the spectator to decide if he or she can identify with 
Zelensky’s participatory campaign (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016). 
 
As the spectators decided whether they could identify with Zelensky’s position on 
‘togetherness’, Zelensky strived to maintain close relations to the Ukrainian people. For 
Zelensky’s case, he downplayed his elitism and presented himself as a ‘ordinary guy’ who 
campaigns on behalf of ‘the people.’ Showcasing Zelensky’s ‘ordinariness’ was the campaign 
vlog series “Ze! President is the Servant of the People,” which showcased Zelensky’s daily life:  
 
For twenty-eight years in a row, we have elected politicians we do not know at all. The 
people have the right to know whom they elect as President of Ukraine! So, I decided to 
show you our election program live and openly. You will see everything: Who we are, 
how we prepare our election program, how we assemble the team and even how we look 
for money. And most importantly - how to become a president while remaining a man! 
(Зе! Президент, 2019) 
 
The above was the description of the first episode of the vlog series titled ‘How to Become a 
President and Remain a Good Man.’ Through script, the campaign attempted to construct a 
profile of Zelensky in which the audience could identify with and relate to, and ultimately view 
Zelensky as a ‘true representative’ of the Ukrainian people. Due to the act of advocacy usually 
performed by populist actors through emphasis that they are a ‘true representative’ of the people, 
Zelensky further accentuated his identification with the people and humbleness in two quotes 
voiced at the stadium debate: 
 
“I could never imagine me, an ordinary guy from Krivoy Rog, would be running for the 
highest office…” (Ruptly, 2019) 
 
“The president has to be a person, a person from the Ukrainian people.” (Ruptly, 2019) 
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Superficially, Zelensky’s performed speech created the impression of being an ordinary 
Ukrainian citizen, despite his celebrity status and fortunes. In effort to build a close relationship 
amongst the people, Zelensky reinforced an image in which his spectators could relate and 
identify with. As such, the basis Zelensky’s campaign program was composed of the Ukrainian 
people’s needs and demands. An element of populist performance is placing the people’s needs 
and demands above everything else in the campaign; therefore, Zelensky’s presidential program 
comprised of posts which claimed through language of reversing the social inequalities which 
arose from Ukraine’s transition from a communist economic system to a market economy 
(Kuzio, 2019, p. 486): 
“My goal is to build a state that provides its citizens with quality services. This requires 
minimizing the number of state functions. Less Man in the life of Man, more Man in the 
life of the State!” (Ze! Команда, 2019) 
 
The above program extract, titled ‘Man has the Highest Value,’ demonstrates the versatility and 
thin nature of Zelensky’s program. Thus, the program provided Zelensky the ability through text 
to remodel his representativeness as the program could be framed and manipulated to adhere to 
the peoples demands. 
Populist rhetoric calls for the removal of the amoral elite in replacement for a moral elite. 
Populists consider society as being, “separated into two homogenous groups and antagonistic 
groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Populists present 
themselves as the ‘true representative’ of the ‘pure people.’ Accompanied, is the discourse of 
populist actors attacking the elite commonly under the accusation of the elite being the source of 
society’s corruption (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 391). In Zelensky’s campaign discourse, he 
targeted the political and oligarchic elites as the source of Ukraine’s systemic corruption. 
Thereby, by focusing on Ukrainian society’s popular grievance of systemic corruption, Zelensky 
portrayed himself as the main fighter against state corruption: 
“While all our politicians are having breakfast in Davos, we are starting to clean the 
country together, let's start with the snow! 😉 Join, record a video and tag!”  
(Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
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The post linguistically constructed a division between the political ‘elites’ and ‘the people.’ The 
‘elites’ being the politicians attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland and 
‘the people’ being the people in Ukraine. Visually emphasizing his efforts to ‘clear away 
corruption’ from Ukrainian society, Zelensky’s post was accompanied by a video featuring 
Zelensky along with his colleagues shovelling snow in order to ‘clear a pathway.’ In addition, 
the action of Zelensky shoveling snow provided two connotations. The first being that Zelensky 
is an ‘ordinary man’ completing manual labour. The second being that Zelensky is a man 
committed to clearing a new path for the country by removing the country’s corruption with ‘the 
people’- together. 
 
The elite are commonly accused by populists of betraying the people, and political 
opponent and incumbent President Petro Poroshenko became the verbally accused in Zelensky’s 
campaign. Zelensky’s campaign predominately criticized his opponent for further corrupting 
Ukraine under his presidency. In this manner, Zelensky linguistically framed Poroshenko as 
being a member of the ‘corrupt elite’ as was written in the following two posts: 
 
“During the five years of Petro Poroshenko's presidency, Ukraine has managed to rise 
only a few positions in the ranking of corruption, remaining one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world.” (Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
 
There is a demand for radical change in society. And most of the changes that the 
government has initiated even over the last five years are imitations 😤 The political elite 
have remained virtually unchanged for 27 years…They have broken away from people 
and don't want to hear them. Corruption is the same, politics as well. Time to say 
goodbye to the old system and build your dream country. Together we can reach our 
goal! Vote for Ze! 🤝 (Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
Zelensky’s above posts performed a linguistic attack on Poroshenko, which was executed 
in a manner usually applied by populists, which encompasses targeting the political elites of the 
population. Following populist practices, Zelensky called upon ‘breaking the system’ of the 
endemically corrupt government of Ukraine. A common populist tactic is voicing to kick out the 
‘oppressing’ political establishment (Friedman, 2017). This rhetoric is often accompanied by 
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placing emphasis on bringing ‘awareness’ to the people of their oppression with the populist 
actor being the provider of emancipation (Mudde, 2004). 
In addition to attacking Poroshenko through script under claims of corruption, Zelensky 
criticized Poroshenko through verbal mockery. Zelensky exploited the frustration of the 
Ukrainian public by criticizing the political elites through humour in the lead-up to the stadium 
debate (Korosteleva, 2019). This entailed challenging Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko 
to attend the stadium debates in addition to ‘compulsory’ drug tests. Through mockery speech, 
Zelensky indirectly asserted that Poroshenko was unfit to continuing being the President of 
Ukraine: 
“The candidates will have to undergo compulsory medical checks and prove to the people 
that there are no alcoholics or drug addicts among them. The country needs a healthy 
president.” (Euronews, 2019)  
As the stadium debate enfolded, Zelensky continued the linguistic rhetoric of Poroshenko 
being corrupt. Specifically, Zelensky demonised his predecessor as corrupt and greedy, blaming 
Poroshenko for the ongoing War in Donbass and allowing for oligarchs to profit from the war 
(Hosa & Wilson, 2019).  Thus, at the stadium debate, Zelensky capitalised on public discontent 
over unpopular reforms and frustration at the continuation of war with pro-Russian separatists 
blaming the political elite Poroshenko (Kuzio, 2019, p. 498): 
“There are two Poroshenko’s – the first is the expert in front of the cameras and the 
second is a corrupt politician behind the cameras.” (Ruptly, 2019) 
 
“I’m a result Mr. Poroshenko of your mistakes and your failed promises.”  
(Ruptly, 2019) 
 
The ostracizing of particular societal groups is a common characteristic of populist discourse. 
The ostracized groups by the populist actor are not regarded as part of the elite, but rather as 
either prejudicially favoured by the elites or as conspiring with the elites against ‘the people’ 
(Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016, p. 1111). However, in Zelensky’s case ostracization of 
any particular groups was absent, apart from the political elites and the oligarchs: 
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Volodymyr Zelensky unites the country!✌️Why is it so easy? For we do not divide people 
on left and right. We do not divide people into Ukrainian or Russian speaking, or into one 
or another. We are simply all together: we all think one language - the language of 
equality! (Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
 
In addition, generally when societies are experiencing a crisis, the society is vulnerable to 
populist resentments which invoke targeting particular societal groups. However, despite 
Ukraine’s ongoing war in Eastern Ukrainian fought between the Ukrainian armed forces and pro-
Russian separatists, Zelensky refrained from targeting groups and escalating ethno-linguistic 
tensions and identity cleavages. Rather, Zelensky uniquely applied the theme of commonality 
and unity.  
 
 Invoking the ‘heartland’ is another key element of populist rhetoric. The term ‘heartland’ 
according to Paul Taggart is the “idealized conception of the community” (Taggart, 2004, p. 
274). Accordingly, this ‘place’ derives from the populists’ perception of the country’s past and 
what has been lost in the present. Thereby, the populist actor constructs the ‘heartland’ based on 
his or her own imagination and emotions (Taggart, 2004). In the context of Zelensky’s 
campaign, it focused on building the ‘Ukraine of our dreams,’ which was a repeated phrase 
posted throughout both rounds of the election campaign:   
 
“Join us, let’s create the Ukraine of our dreams together!” (Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
 
Numerous posts across Zelensky’s Facebook and Instagram pages contained the above 
phrase. The phrase was applied in the context of reforming the country by means of removing 
state corruption and raising Ukrainian living standards. However, unlike mainstream populism, 
the imagined future of Ukraine by Zelensky’s campaign was not derived from Ukraine’s history, 
but was rather derived through comparisons to the living standards in neighbouring European 
countries: 
 
“If you dream of European quality roads, convenient environmental transport, affordable 
flights - fill out the questionnaire: https://ze2019.com/infra and help us build our ′Dream 
Country.’ ” (Команда Зеленського, 2019) 
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As read in the former post, Zelensky’s campaign emphasized throughout the election its 
pursuit was to build a ‘dream Ukraine.’ However, this ‘imagined Ukraine’ was not derived from 
Ukraine’s history but rather from present aspirations. Thereby, Zelensky’s campaign cannot be 
considered as containing the populist claim of invoking a heartland.  
 
By means of application of post-structuralism and discourse analysis, it was assessed 
which five common elements of populism were present in Zelensky’s campaign. Upon 
qualitative interpretive analysis, it was determined that three out of the five elements of populist 
performances were manifested in Zelensky’s campaign: sovereignty of the people; advocating 
for the people; attacking the elites. The two elements not present in Zelensky’s campaign was the 
ostracization of others and invoking of the heartland. The absence of ostracization of others can 
be explained by Zelensky’s campaign tactic to gain electoral support in the country’s East and 
West, which have increasing become polarized following the Orange Revolution (2004) and 
Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014). Thereby, Zelensky’s campaign avoided suppressing groups, 
particularly common ostracizing rhetoric of ‘pro-Russia’ versus ‘pro-West’ found in Ukraine. 
The groups that were ostracized in the campaign, political elites and oligarchs, were regarded 
across demographic groups as the sources of the Ukraine’s economic burdens. Thus, the lack of 
popular populist style of communication of group ostracization in Zelensky’s campaign allowed 
his campaign to appeal to diverse groups. As for Zelensky’s communicated heartland, it was 
unique to the heartlands commonly advocated by populists. Zelensky’s ‘imagined Ukraine’ was 
not based on a ‘past Ukraine’ filled with nostalgia based on either Soviet or Russophile views of 
history. Rather, the ‘heartland’ of Zelensky campaign was a future Ukraine based on 
contemporary aspirations that are not polarizing within society, instead of being based on 
Ukraine’s history which was a potential divider of society. Furthermore, Zelensky’s campaign 
contained only some basis of elements found with populist communication style. Thereby, it 
cannot be claimed that Zelensky’s campaign completely fulfilled populist communication styles. 






4.2 Zelensky Populism 
 
 
This section will take upon the challenge of characterizing Zelensky’s form of populism 
in the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election campaign. First, this section will reflect upon the 
categorization of Zelensky’s campaign as ‘populism 2.0’. Second, this thesis will analyze the 
original attributes of Zelensky’s campaign. The section will end by delivering a novel 
categorization of the form of populism of which Zelensky administered in his presidential 
campaign. 
 
4.2.1 Populism 2.0 
 
Following the election of Volodymyr Zelensky as President of Ukraine, multiple populist 
labels were produced by academics and journalists to describe Zelensky’s media phenomenon. 
The most commonly applied label to describe Zelensky’s form of populism was ‘populism 2.0.’ 
Paulo Gerbaudo describes ‘populism 2.0’ as an interactive and participatory form of populism 
where in which populist actors appeal to varied groups via social media platforms to address and 
promote the subject of opposition to economic and political elites (Gerbaudo, 2015, p. 69). 
Thereby, the common man is no longer the ideal target subjects of populists, but rather generic 
social media audiences, resulting in social media platforms to be a tool for enhancing ‘populism 
2.0’. Due to Zelensky’s campaign style predominately being centered on social media platforms, 
his campaign was commonly categorized by academics and journalists as ‘populism 2.0.’ 
Particularly, philosopher Volodymyr Yermolenko (2019) described Zelensky’s merging of 
politics with entertainment and conducting a political campaign with marketing as a symptom of 
‘populism 2.0’. Whereas Professor Andrew Wilson and Joanna Hosa Andrew Wilson and Joanna 
Hosa (2019) labelled Zelensky as conducting ‘populism 2.0’ for staging his campaign through 
online platforms as well as through comedy tours with the Kvartal 95 performance troupe. As for 
journalist Yuri Zoria (2019), he claimed that Zelensky’s massive implementation of social media 
and marketing strategies, in addition to the ‘long-time’ airing of the television series Servant of 
the People, provided justification to refer to Zelensky’s campaign as ‘populism 2.0’. However, 
categorizing Zelensky’s campaign as ‘populism 2.0’ only partly explains Zelensky’s campaign in 
terms of social media. This populist label fails to take into account the lack of political ideology 
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of Zelensky’s social media campaign. Thereby, ‘populism 2.0’ does not completely describe the 
campaign style and tactics conducted in Zelensky’s campaign. 
 
4.2.2 Originality  
 
Commonly, populist actors frame themselves as ‘anti-establishment’ and the ‘true 
representative’ of the people. Zelensky administered such framing be referring to his acted 
character in television series Servant of the People. Zelensky’s television character Vasyl 
Petrovych Holodborodko, an ordinary high school teacher who becomes President of Ukraine 
and removes the corrupt political system to transform Ukraine into a prosperous and proud 
nation, was applied as Zelensky’s campaign image. However, it should be noted that Zelensky 
was not the first politician to leverage their media image from television to construct their 
political image. For example, in the recent case of the American President Donald Trump, he 
transferred his image as a decisive boss from the television series The Apprentice to the image of 
a strong presidential leader (Heritage, 2016). Whereas the late American President Ronald 
Reagan applied his popular image of being an actor as an argument for himself being a ‘citizen 
politician’ and a representative of the people who support him at the ballot box which was 
previously the box office (Brownell, 2016), Though, unique to populist campaigns was 
Zelensky’s political platform and political persona both being derived from the plot of a 
television series. Thereby, exclusive to Zelensky’s campaign was his application of life imitating 
art by means of transforming his television character into a campaign image. 
 
Just as populist actors advocate for the people, Zelensky did so by means of comedic 
performances. Throughout the election campaign, Zelensky rejected to administer traditional 
mechanisms of communicating his electoral program to voters. Zelensky had refused to 
communicate with the media, participate on television channels apart from making one 
exception, and have debates with his opponents apart from his organized stadium debate. Instead, 
Zelensky’s campaign incorporated Kvartal-95 performances in effort to avoid conducting a 
traditional political campaign (Carroll, 2019). Though, it is common for populists to conduct 
performances in their campaigns through interviews, new segments, and rallies. However, 
original to Zelensky’s campaign was his campaign comedy tour with Kvartal 95 performers in 
attempt to portray Zelensky as a ‘man of the people’ by continuing his image as an entertainer. In 
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addition, communicating with voters through the unique structure of a comedy tour, Zelensky 
further distanced himself from the political elites. Moreover, Zelensky’s application of the 
comedy tour was an original populist tactic to separate himself from the political establishment 
while exhibiting his presidential platform. 
 
Zelensky portrayed himself as a ‘true representative’ of the people by means of selfie 
photos and videos. Through the uploading of ‘native’ footage which appear to be taken and 
filmed by Zelensky himself, Zelensky’s campaign produced the impression that Zelensky was 
speaking ‘directly’ to social media spectators. Unique to populist tactics was the daily postings 
of selfie photos and videos onto social media platforms (Facebook and Instagram) of Zelensky’s 
campaign activities. As such, Zelensky’s campaign had distinguished campaign tactics compared 
to popular populist style through its marketing of Zelensky’s campaign messages through both 
selfie photos and videos. 
 
A general element found across populist ideological platforms is exploitation of 
particular societal groups. However, Zelensky’s campaign lacked an ideological platform, or any 
defined statements and significant policy proposals (Rohozinska & Shpak, 2019). Throughout 
the campaign, Zelensky was short of clearly articulated positions through his performance 
campaign strategy, which provided himself avoidance of interviews and public appearances. 
Thus, Zelensky served as a ‘blank page’ of which voters could draw their own candidate’ as 
described by Ukrainian writer Oksana Zabuzhko (Kuczyński, 2019). Resulting was the ability of 
Zelensky’s campaign to appeal to diverse groups with voters determining Zelensky as they 
seemed fit, likely drawing his profile from the character of Holoborodko from Servant of the 
People (Rohozinska & Shpak, 2019). Zelensky’s suppression of an ideological platform was an 
original strategy in which Zelensky created a novel form of populism. 
 
4.2.3 Spectacular Populism 
 
Upon qualitative content analysis, this thesis concludes that Zelensky orchestrated a new 
form of populism - Spectacular Populism. Zelensky’s campaign was based upon a series of 
online performances on social media (YouTube, Facebook, Instagram) and live performances 
conducted during the Kvartal 95 comedy tour and at the stadium debate. These performances 
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created the impression to spectators of a social movement directed by Zelensky’s presidential 
campaign. Thereby, as Zelensky’s campaign became entrenched within Ukrainian society, the 
image of which he portrayed of himself in the campaign became the perceived reality of who he 
would be as President of Ukraine. Under the form of Spectacular Populism, some elements of 
traditional populism are still present: emphasizing the sovereignty of the people, advocating for 
the people, attacking the elites. However, the ostracization of others and invoking a heartland are 
not consistent elements. Rather, unique to Spectacular Populism is the element of unity in the 
masses not based on ideological orientations. Accompanying this form of populism is the 
populist actor’s application of performances to establish their political persona. The following 
section will provide further elaboration on the differentiation of Spectacular Populism from 
populist factors generally found in Ukraine and Europe itself. 
 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine experienced economic, political, 
and military crises which Ukrainian populists have used to mobilize votes. Fitting to Taggart’s 
(2004) claim, crises lead populists into popularity in Ukraine. However, Zelensky rose into 
Ukrainian politics in 2019, five years after the Ukrainian crisis (2013 - 2014): Revolution of 
Dignity (2013 – 2014); Annexation of Crimea (2014); War in Donbass (2014). According to 
Taras Kuzio (2019), populists in Ukraine have five additional common factors: against control 
by international financial organizations; radical rhetoric against the corrupt elites and the ‘liberal 
establishment’; anti-democratic and authoritarian; unsupportive of reforms; draw on different 
ideologies to mobilize electoral support. Conversely, Zelensky campaign did not adopt these 
common factors practiced by Ukrainian populists. Ukrainian populists, such as Yulia 
Tymoshenko and Oleh Lyashko, often criticize the International Monetary Fund for imposing 
heavy demands on the government in return for financial assistance (Kuzio, 2019, p. 492). 
Whereas rhetoric against international organizations, or foreign powers in general, was 
unincluded in Zelensky’s campaign. Long leading populist Tymoshenko continuously applies 
radical rhetoric against ‘corrupt’ authorities and oligarchs (Kuzio, 2019, p. 492). Zelensky’s 
campaign did include language against the corrupt elites; however, it was not directed to the 
‘liberal establishment’, nor was the language radicalized. Authoritarian populist parties have 
arisen in Ukraine’s political arena, including The Party of Regions which sought to monopolize 
power. Though, Zelensky’s campaign emphasized democratic procedures, particularly voting 
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and countering election fraud. Ukrainian populists provide weak support to reforms, with Vox 
Ukraine ranking Tymoshenko at 38 per cent on their Index of Support for Reform, and the two 
populist parties All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" and Radical Party do not support judicial, 
pension or healthcare reforms (Kuzio, 2019, p. 495). Differing from Ukrainian populists, 
Zelensky supported reforms through referendums during his campaign. As for political ideology, 
Ukraine’s populists are labelled under the ideology of either ‘pro-Western’ or ‘pro-Russian’. 
Though, Zelensky’s campaign was against these polarizing labels and was generally very limited 
in ideology. Thus, Zelensky’s campaign practiced a form of populism novel to Ukrainian 
politics. 
Populists in Europe have gained prominence since the 1990s after the end of the Cold 
War. Indeed, populists have been present in Europe since the Enlightenment with calls for 
radical forms of direct democracy and continued its presence into some of the ideas of the French 
Revolution, carrying into the turn of the 19th century and into the 20th century (Verbeek & 
Zaslove, 2019, p. 3). Though, the intensification of the European integration process and advent 
of globalization in the 1990s harnessed an increased generation of populists with ideological 
orientations as European citizens grew uncertain of the capacities of their governments. 
Particularly, extremist right-wing populists grew across Europe which often included sentiments 
of hostility to immigration and anti-Islamic xenophobia. Those sentiments have been widespread 
across Europe, including amongst post-communist politicians as exemplified by Andrej Babiš in 
the Czech Republic, Paweł Kukiz in Poland, Viktor Orban in Hungary, and Mart Helme in 
Estonia. Populist right-wings nationalists produce nostalgia for a more ethnically homogenous 
nation (Kuzio, 2019, p. 489). Though, in the case of Zelensky’s campaign, there were no calls for 
a homogenous nation based on a romanticized past Ukraine. On the contrary, Zelensky’s 
campaign promoted uniting across all groups, regardless of language, ethnicity, and language, for 
a future Ukraine unforeseen. As for left-wing populists in Europe, they are generally anti-
globalisation, advocating for a system that lies between capitalism and socialism. Left-wing 
parties in Europe includes SYRIZA in Greece and Direction – Social Democracy in 
neighbouring Slovakia. Anti-globalisation sentiments were non-existent within Zelensky’s 
campaign, as the campaign did not include statements related to international institutions and the 
idea of globalization was promoted in positive notion through audio-visualization of ‘Ze Team’ 
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being ‘global’. Populists in Europe, both left and right, hold ideological orientations and are 
dividers of society. Zelensky is unique to European populism as he held an extremely limited 





















The main objective of this thesis was to analyse Zelensky’s campaign strategies through 
social media. The campaign strategies applied through social media were converted into a 
political resource by means of direct communication with social media users and mobilizing the 
masses. The main research question was how a politically inexperienced electoral candidate can 
construct a movement of electoral support which unites the people through social media 
campaigning? As the historical political background of Ukraine suggested through two 
performative revolutions, Ukrainian society was prepared to restart power by means of complete 
reshuffling of the political elites. Zelensky was presumed to have been elected president as a 
result of Ukrainians’ desire to eradicate the political elites to be replaced by someone with no 
known political connections. 
The results of the qualitative content analysis on 1483 media uploads on three social 
media platforms (YouTube, Facebook, Instagram) that were uploaded during the time period of 
January 1, 2019 – April 21, 2019 indicated that Zelensky’s campaign transferred entrainment 
into politics by conducting a performed social movement. Overall, a large majority of the 
postings and videos were found to fall under the categorization of a social movement (76% of 
postings) rather than performance (24% of postings). In doing so, Zelensky’s campaign created a 
new form of populism which is absent of clear political ideology and is all inclusive while 
merging politics into entertainment – spectacular populism. Zelensky held new campaign tactics 
as his political persona was heavily based on his screen performances all the while having a very 
limited ideology. As such, through Zelensky’s performative communication, which included 
traditional elements of populist communication style and incorporated new elements such as 
being inclusive, a new form of populism emerged. Further research should be conducted on the 
elements of spectacular populism and its potential pervasiveness in future campaign tactics.  
Found in the study was the increased prevalence of the spectacle in campaigns. Through 
the application of social media platforms, comedy tours, and a stadium debate in Zelensky’s 
campaign, it was revealed that a spectacle was created. As such, Zelensky’s campaign itself was 
the topic of the spectacle. Therefore, Debord’s concept of the spectacle has increased in 
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relevance due to the increased consumption of consumer products that support social media 
platforms within contemporary campaign tactics.  
This thesis is not without limitations. First, the thesis did not include the 2019 Ukrainian 
parliamentary election campaign of Zelensky’s political party Servant of the People, which could 
have further validated the uniqueness of Zelensky’s campaign tactics. Second, the social media 
posts were translated by a non-native Russian and Ukrainian speaker. 
At the time of writing, Zelensky’s approval rating has continued to deteriorate since his 
electoral win. Between September 2019 – July 2020, Zelensky’s approval ratings having 
significantly declined. Following two performative revolutions and the media phenomenon 
performed by Zelensky in the 2019 presidential campaign, Zelensky and his party continue using 
the same communication tactics. In other words, it seems the spectacular populism has moved 
beyond political campaigns, which could act as a steppingstone for further research into the 
correlation of using performative tactics for social change while governing and decreasing 
approval ratings. 
It would be contributing to research how Zelensky’s social media strategy, creating a new 
form of populism, is adopted by other political candidates. The campaign reached across 
international mass media and received wide-spread coverage in both social and traditional media. 
In the political sphere, it also received widespread attention. Therefore, Zelensky’s campaign 
became not only a national media phenomenon but also international. Thus, Zelensky’s 
campaign tactics could be adopted by other political candidates. So, it should be researched 
whether contemporary politicians are adopting increased performance style of campaigning. In 
addition, many citizens are growing in discontent towards their government following 
insufficient handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, while increasing their use of social media 
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Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BsKys_yAaMo/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського] (2019, January 5) [Instagram Video].  
Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BsQB6o6COiw/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського] (2019, January 7) [Instagram Photo].  
Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BsVl-yIAK5g/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського] (2019, January 8) Залишайте свої варіанти під  
постом! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BsX7xgQAG0V/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського] (2019, January 8) Вітаємо офіційних  
представників! [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BsYvXfagORu/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського] (2019, January 9) Карта України заповнюється.  
[Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/Bsak8UFAM6_/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського] (2019, January 9) Цікаво розроблена стратегія,  
високі технології, ближче до людей! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bs0Pz90gYbV/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського] (2019, January 21) З перших вуст: перший  
серйозний Зе!з‘їзд Слуги Народ [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bs5KdPmgwQF/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського] (2019, January 31) Ми просто мусимо  
познайомити вас із контакт-центром нашої Зе!команди. [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved 
from https://www.instagram.com/p/Bs-IWu7gqd4/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 23) про дороги, і не про дороги  
[Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/Bs_FBL3Apu1/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 24)  





Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 25) Сьогодні Володимир  
Зеленський та Зе!команда презентували передвиборчу програму кандидата на пост 
Президента України. [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BtEPJwXgGSq/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 25) Як стати Президентом і  
залишитися людиною!  [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BtEmvHkAtsT/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 25) Ситуація незмінна [Instagram  
Photo]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BvbOo3qg2YG/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 25) До Зе!команди долучилось уже  
понад півмільйона людей! [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BtF9JGVACts/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 25) Другий випуск "Зе Президент  
Слуга Народу" уже чекає на каналі! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BtHIhEMhH7Z/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 28) Зе!команда оголошує конкурс  
на кращий… ФЕЙК [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BtK9xzmhdd6/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 28) Ти щасливий, бо маєш  
можливість першим побачити третю частину VLOG «Зе Президент Слуга Народу»! 
[Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BtLAvH5BiQb/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 29) Карта України… Заповнена!  
[Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BtOwfiSAhDu/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 30) Сідайте, будь ласка, з нами!  
Сідайте дивитись СПЕЦВИПУСК # 1 - Як знищити корупцію в Україні? [Instagram 
Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BtQFIRAhho-/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, January 30) Розробили кілька різновидів  
кайфових ілюстрацій, які будемо використовувати для реклами на бордах міста у 
лютому [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BtQohCWAsLm/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 1) А ви скільки підтягуєтесь?  
[Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BtV7Y0XAxCW/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 3) Президентський ранок  
починається не з кави. [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from  
https://www.instagram.com/p/BtasAW3itQY/ 
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Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 5) Ви маєте знати їх в обличчя,  
адже це найкрутіші представники Зе!команди в містах [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved 
from https://www.instagram.com/p/BtgFkKxgBnx/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 5) Ви маєте знати їх в обличчя,  
адже це найкрутіші представники Зе!команди в містах! [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved 
from https://www.instagram.com/p/BtgGrQ1ghOM/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 6) Презентуємо вам результати  
конкурсу вибухового ФЕЙКОМЕТУ про @zelenskiy_official! [Instagram Video]. 
Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/Bti8rE3CbGJ/ 
   
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 6) Воу, пам'ятаєте кіпіш з  
питанням про варіанти бордів? [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bti_dgVgGh_/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 9) Новий VLOG! [Instagram  
Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/Btp4fMcihKV/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 11) Ми продовжуємо знайомити  
вас з крутими людьми — представниками Зе!команди у вашому міст [Instagram 
Photo]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/Btu_kcsFlmk/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 13) Воу-воу, місто Рівне,  
зустрічай свій новий нереально крутий Зе!офіс ! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bt05CP5CXv2/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 14) Івано-Франківськ, соу хот  
ньюз! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/Bt2vAfYCB_O/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 14) Плюс один Зе!офіс. Де? У  
Сумах [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/Bt27P2-CpRz/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 15) Ура, Зе!офіс у Львові  
відкрито [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bt5kR0CCkTW/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 15) Attention, столиця! Зе!офіс у  
Києві вже відкрито [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bt56uDsi-Zy/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 16) Чи можливо забезпечити  
прозорість на Виборах–2019? Відповідь Зе!команди — «Так!» [Instagram Photo]. 




Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 16) Жарт чи не жарт? [Instagram  
Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/Bt8kWwACxTl/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 18) Говоримо з Володимиром  
Зеленським затишно на березі в Одесі? [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuBDZdMikR1/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 19) Всі, хто розвивається у сфері  
ІТ- та діджитал-маркетингу, ласкаво просимо сюди: t.me/zedigital [Instagram Video]. 
Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BuDb5WBi6hX/ 
 
 Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 19) Чернівці, а ви знали, що  
Зе!офіс у вашому місті вже відкрито? [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuDwtcKCJex/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 20) Херсон, Зе!офіс вже  
відкрито! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuGp9Tpgzy-/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 20) Зе!офіс у Полтаві відкрито!  
[Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BuG5DLHg5tC/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 21) Новий болючий випуск  
VLOG! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BuIulhbhcl6/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 21) Житомир, чекали? Зе!офіс у  
вашому місті відкрито! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuI0_iZByH_/ 
  
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 21) Прозоро обговорюємо новини  
[Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BuJEYf5BSvb/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 21) Зе!офіс вже є у Черкасах!  
[Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BuJXwvDhsRV/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 21) Хмельницький, зустрічай свій  
Зе!офіс! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BuJq09ng10h/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 22) Ура, Зе!офіс у Харкові  
відкрито! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuLqY13h3Z3/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 23) Чернігів, зустрічайте ваш  




Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 23) Агов, Одеса! У вашому місті  
вже є Зе!офіс [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuOazPthTRT/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 23) новому влозі гуляємо  
Львовом та шукаємо відповіді на такі питання [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuOvKEQBoJY/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 23) Гарні новини для вас,  
Кропивницький! Зе!офіс вже відкрито. [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuO_jwTgXIQ/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 24) Просто хочемо розповісти,  
наскільки класний офіс Зе!команди у Сумах [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuQcMQsBcSi/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 24) Зе!офіс в Ужгороді відкрито!  
[Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BuQmPAvh7Gy/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 24) Донеччина,  
Зе!офіс вже чекає на вас! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuRRl9FhzSX/ 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 25) Більше ніякого кумівства та  
кулуарних призначень на посади. [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuTBr2TBPVB/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 25) Запоріжжя, для вас круті  
новини — Зе!офіс у вашому місті відкрито! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuTKznPgCec/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 26) Продовжуємо мандрівку  
Україною в новому влозі Зе!президент Слуга Народу. [Instagram Video]. Retrieved 
from https://www.instagram.com/p/BuVkYpQBuDm/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 26) Зе!офіс у Кривому Розі  
відкрито! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuVwUNDAChr/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 26) Пишіть у коментарі, що  
думаєте про цю ситуацію! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuVwe2CgosI/ 
  
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 26) Тернопіль, а ви знаєте, що  




Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 27) Команда Зеленського  
захоплює світ! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuZgOo1BJ-s/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 28) Ура, Зе!офіс у Луцьку  
відкрито! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from  
https://www.instagram.com/p/BubU9QhhL3l/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, February 28) Дніпро, чекали? Зе!офіс у  
вашому місті відкрито! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BubbHylAwNg/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 1) Зе!офіс вже є у  
Черкасах! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BudkEEXBCmZ/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 1) У Дніпрі та частині  
Дніпропетровської області тепер є офіційний представник Зе!команди [Instagram 
Photo]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BueLAoegXi-/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 2) Агов, Кам’янське, Зе!офіс у  
вашому місті відкрито! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BugAEWkBUv9/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 3) Закон один для всіх? [Instagram  
Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BujVmythXH4/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 5) Вінниця, зустрічайте  
Зе!офіс! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BunpniIhwHp/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 5) Хочемо показати, який крутий  
Зе!офіс відкрито в Канаді [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bun6qE3A-zh/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 5) Ми починаємо всеукраїнський  
челендж [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Buo6SnjhqgU/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 6) Крок за кроком — і світова карта  
майже захоплена! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bup6zm-BzOF/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 6) Вітайте учасників конкурсу  
Зе!стікерів! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from  
https://www.instagram.com/p/Buqaz7FgoLm/ 
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Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 7) Відкриваємо гарно запаковані  
подарунки від чинної «політичної еліти», а там — фейки, лайно, погрози. Не 
оригінально! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bus0tACAjXh/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 7) люс один, плюс один, плюс цілий  
світ і всі ці люди підтримують нас — Команду Володимира Зеленського! [Instagram 
Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/ButlcnnASG5/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 7) Чи можна стати  
Президентом та залишитися людиною? Можна! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/ButozcOg_bQ/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 8) Володимир Зеленський вітає з  
Міжнародним жіночим днем дорогих жінок [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BuvfmaqhksY/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 8) Новий Президент — скоро!  
[Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Buv_MlLAKsC/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 8) Світова карта заповнюється  
зеленим [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from  
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bu5x91JhyRF/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 12) «Я людина — це головний  
статус!» — Володимир Зеленський. [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bu58YJ3h1NM/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 13) Як стати президентом та при  
цьому залишитись людиною? [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/zeteam2019/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 14) Чи можлива висока заробітна  
плата для вчителів в Україні?! [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bu-zP6PAkZz/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 15) Відкрито говоримо  
з Володимиром Зеленським. [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BvBl5-8hWj9/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 18) Просто залиште на пам'ять  





Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 18) Команда Зеленського в Італії  
розповіла: "Найперше, що зроблять українці, які живуть в Італії, — підуть на 
вибори!" [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BvKIaJDhleo/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 19) Нещодавно відбулась ще одна  
кайфова зустріч Команди Зеленського в Канаді [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BvMTCgIAXYf/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 20) Ми щодня відстежуємо прояви  
вашої підтримки, але таку шалену бачимо вперше! [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BvOxFxFgCZy/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 21) Ми чекали цього більше вас!  
Тільки дізналися про реліз — і одразу говоримо вам! [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved 
from https://www.instagram.com/p/BvRxQSkBi4X/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 22) Він розуміє, як зміниться його  
життя. Розуміє, як буде складно. [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BvTdmgVhUA3/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 23) Це було неймовірно! [Instagram  
Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BvVzh4BBfa0/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 24) Харків, дякуємо вам! [Instagram  
Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BvYfw4_BoK-/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 25) Дякуємо, Сєвєродонецьк!  
[Instagram Video]. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/BvbYR4-hBzK/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 25) На зв'язку Команда Зеленського  
в Польщі! [Instagram Photo]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bvb0KNPgjHZ/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 25) Те, на що ви так чекали, те, що  
ви бажали побачити. [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BvcAterh98v/ 
 
Ze Team 2019 [@ Команда Зеленського]. (2019, March 26) уми, дякуємо! Як завжди,  
емоційно та грандіозно провели з вами час. [Instagram Video]. Retrieved from 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BveaH5JBRt9/ 
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Please note that assurances on confidentiality will be strictly adhered to unless evidence of 
wrongdoing or potential harm is uncovered. In such cases the University may be obliged to 
contact relevant statutory bodies/agencies.  
 
 105 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
There will be a written summary of results to all if requested. Results will be made available to 
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If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of this research project, you can contact 
the College of Social Science Ethics of the University of Glasgow Officer Dr. Muir Houston, 
email: Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
